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Module 11 Suggested Reading 
Introduction 
This module contains reprints of several articles related to the ideas of 
stages of development and self-regulation and a bibliography of books and art ic les  
that you may wish to study after you complete the workshop. 
To pravtde you w i t h  examples of applfcations of the instructional techniques 
that you were introduced to in the workshop, and t o  make available a bibliography 
tha t  you can use for further study. 
If you would like further background information on Piaget's theory as related 
to physics instruction, read one or more of the three reprlints selected from AJP 
acd TPT t h a t  are included in the instructional materials for this module. If 
you would like additional information on Plaget ' s  theory tn general, read the  
article by Piaget reprinted here or consult the books and articles l i s t e d  in the 
bibliography -- most are available in paperback and many can be obtained in any 
college or universTty books tare. 
This module contains the following materials: 
1. Reading list a£ suggested books and articles. 
2. Joe W, bi&nnon and John W. knner,  r re Colleges Concerned w i t h  
Intellectual Development?" American Journal of Physics 39, 1047 (19 71). 
3. John W. Renner and Anton E, Lawson, "piagetian Theory and Instruction i.n 
Physics, " Physics Teacher g, 165 (1 9 73) . 
4. John W. Reaner and Anton E. Lawson, "Promoting Intellectual Eevelsp=nt 
Through Sc f a c e  Teaching, " Physics Teacher 11, 273 (19 73).  
5, Jean Pfaget, ~ournal'of Research in Scfence Teachfng Vol. 2, 
pp, 176-186 ( 1 9 6 4 ) .  
6 .  Anton E. Lawson and Warren T. Wolman, "Physics Problems and the 
Process of self -~egulation" The Physics Teacher 13, 465 (1975) . 
Module 11 lnstiiictional Materials 
Books 
- ,  
1. Anderson,DeVito,Pyrli,Kellog,iCochmdo~erandWeigand,Deve~oping , 
Glil-dren ' s-inking Through Science, Prent ice-Hall , N. J . 19 70. 
2. ~ u t h  M. Beard, An Outline of Piaget's Developmental Ps)tcholdfy for 
Students and Teachers, Basic Books, Inc., N.Y. 1969. 
3.  David Elkind, Children and Ado1 escence, Interpretive Essays on 
Jean Piaget, - -  Oxford Univ. Prcss. 
4. Mchard I. Evsns, Jean P i w t :  The Man and His Ideas, E.P. Dutton, Co. 
N.Y. 1973. 
5 .  H a n s  G. Furth, Piaget for Teachers, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 
M.J. 1970. 
6 .  Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Qpper, Piawt 's Theory of Intellectual 
Development, Prentice-Hall, fnc . ,  Englewood C l i f f s ,  N . J .  1969. 
7. Rf chard M. Gorman, discover in^ P i a s t ,  Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 
Columbus, Ohio, 1972. 
8. ~ z r b e l  Lnhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking from 
Chfldhood r b  AdblcsCetlce, Msf c Books, N.Y. 1961 (There is a paperback 
classroom e d i t  ion of t h i s  book) 
9. John L. Phillips, Jr. , The Ori-s of Intellect : Piaget ' s Theory, 
W. H, Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1969. 
10. Jean Piaget ,  ~ e n e t i c  Epfstemology, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1970. 
11. Jean Piaget , The Psycholopy of Intelligence, Littlef f eld, Adams , & 'CO . , 
Paterson, N. J. 1968. 
12. Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, Vintage Books, Random House, 
N.Y. 1967, 
13. Jean Piaget, To Understand is To Invent, Grossman Publishers, N.Y. 1973. 
14. John W, Renner, Robert F, Bibens, and Gene G ,  Sheperd, Teacbfng Science 
2n the Secondary School, Harper and Row,' N.Y. 1974, Chapter 4 .  
15. M. F. Rosskopf, L, P. Steffe, and S. Tkback, Eds . ,  Psagetian Cognitive- 
Development Research and Mathematical. Education, Reston, Va, :  National 
Council of Teachers of Hathematics, 1971. 
Selected Artitles 
1. Entire issue, Journal of ksearch i n  Science Teachfng, Val. 2, 1964, 
(Articles by Piaget, Karplus, Ausubel.and Duckworth). 
2. Arnold 8. Arons, "Anatomy of an Introductory Course in Physical science," 
Journal of College Science Teachhg, A p r i l  1972. 
3. Arnold 8. Arons, "Toward Wider Public  Understanding 0 5  Science," American 
Journal of Physics, 41, 769 (1973). 
4. Arnold B. Arons and John Smith, "Definition of Intellectual Objectives 
in a Physical Science Course for Preservice Elementary ~eachers," Scfence 
Education, 58, 3,  pp. 391-400, 1974. 
5 .  B. S. Craig, "The Philosophy of Piaget and its Usefulness to Teachers of 
Chemistry," J. Chem Ed., Dec. 1972, 807-809, 
6 .  David Elkind, "~ iage t  and ScXence  ducati ion. " Science and Children, Nov. 59 72. 
7. Elizabeth F. Karplus and Robert Karplus , "Intellectual Development Beyond 
Elementary School I: Deducttve Logic," School Scfence and Mathematics, 
LXII, 5 (May, 1970) pp, 398-406. 
8. Robert Karplus and R i t a  Peterson, "Intellectual Development: Beyond 
Elementary School 11: Ratio, a S~rveg,'~ School ScSence and Mathematics, 
70, 9 @ceder, 1970j, pp, 813-820, 
9. Edward G. Palmer,  "Acceleratfng the Child's CognStfve Attainments Through 
t he  Inducement of CognStlve Conflict : An interpretation of the Pf aget ian 
Posi t f  on. " Journal of Beseafch 5n Science Teaching, '3, 318-325 (1965). 
10. ~ e a n *  Piaget , "Intellectual Evolution from Adolescence to Adulthood, " 
Human Demlopment , 15, 1 (1 9 7 2 ) .  
Tenn.) cost approx. $2000. An alternative choice might be 
to purchase a PDP/8E with high-speed paper tape reader 
(total cost, approx. $11 NO), or equivalent from another 
manufacturer. 
Teaching Computing in Universities (Her Majesty's 
Stationery Ofiice, London, 1970); Ph,ys. Bull. 21, 482 
(1970). 
A survey of four computer dictionaries gave no defini- 
tion for minicomputers. From The New York Times, 
5 April 1970, Sec. 3, p. 1: 
M a x i  Computers Face Mini Conjlict, by William 13. 
Smith. 
Mini vs Maxi, the reigning issue in the glamorous 
world of fashion, is strangely enough also a major 
point of contention in the definitely unsexy realm of 
computers, 
The definition of a minicomputer depends on to 
whom you are speaking. Descriptions range from 
electronic ca~lculators to the IBM System 3 that 
sells for $42 000. 
A consensus opinion would probably include as 
minicomputers machines that cost less than $25 000 
and that include some t,ype of input-output device 
such as a teleprinter, a memory of about 4000 wards, 
and circuitry capable of performing calculations 
under the control of stored programs written in some 
form of higher-level comput,er language such as 
FORTRAN or BASIC. 
The major manufacturer of minicomputers is the 
Digital Equipment Corporation. Other major makers 
include the Hewlett-Packard Corporation, the Data 
General Corporation, Varian Associates, Honeywell, 
Computer Automation, Irtc., Motorola, the Raytheon 
Corporation and Mini-Computer Systems, Inc. 
Are Colleges Concerned with Intellectual 
Development? 
JOE W. McKJn'NON IIYTRODUCTION 
Oklahoma City University 
OkZuhoma City, Oklahozna 73206 
JOHN W. REKNEE 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma 73069 
(Received 14 December 1970; revised 8 March 1971) 
T h e  assumption i s  often made by college professors tha.t 
incoming freshman students think logically. Using tests 
designed by the Swiss  psychologist J ean  Piaget to evaluate 
logical thought processes, the authors found that 66 of 151 
freshmen exhibited characteristics of tlze concrete opera- 
tional thinker, vihile another 39 did not meet the criteria 
for formal operations. Professors further compound the 
problem by failing to recognize the k inds  of experiences 
incoming freshmen students must  have to move toward 
more logical thoughb. X c K i n n o n ,  using a newly developed 
inquiry-oriented science course based u p o n  Piagetian 
criteria, found a highly signiJicant difference between 
those students who were exposed to tlze course and like 
students who were not. T h e  authors concluded that second- 
ary and elementary teachers do not take advantage of 
inquiry-oriented techniques so necessary to the development 
of logical thought because college professors do not provide 
examples of inquiry.-oriented tenchzng. 
Are colleges and universities making irladeyuate 
ev'aluations of student ability to think logically? 
Is  the unrest today in many universities caused by 
student evaluation of problems ba,sed upon emo- 
tion rather than logic? Do student claims that 
curricululns are irrelevant, trivial, and inadequate 
in terms of the magnitude of the problems facing 
mankind today have substance, or are these 
students unable to evaluate logically the structure 
and necessity of those curricula? These questions, 
together with suspiciorls voiced by various 
professors of science about the inability of their 
freshman students to think logically about the 
szrnplest kind of problems, led the authors to 
question whether or not most college freshmen do 
think logically. This doubt about the ability of the 
entering freshman to think logically led to the 
following liypotllesis: Tht: majority of entering 
college freshmen do not come to college with 
adequate skills to argue logically about the 
importance of a given principle when the context 
in which it is used is slightly altered. 
Since these students have been accepted by 
boards of admission that based their decisions 
upon high school transcripts and various estab- 
lislied ent>rance examinatio~is uch as the Anlericarl 
.T. W. McKinnon and J .  W .  Renner 
TABLE I. A comparison of operational level of 131 students or not this was true for American college freshmen, 
on Piagetian data. i.e., had those students become formal opera- 
Per tional? 
Male Female Total number cent A STUDY OF THE ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 l - y  OF COLLEGE 
FRESHMEN TO THINK LOGICALLY 
Formal 25 8 33 25 
Post-concrete 12 20 32 25 
Concrete 16 50 66 50 
Mean Piagetian 12.82 9.45 Average 10.74 
score 
College Test (ACT) and the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT), a different means of evaluation was 
sought. The evaluative system used is one based 
upon the ability of the student to think critically 
about problems, the answers to which would be 
found in his experiential background and could 
not be derived from memorized data. 
WHEN DO STUDENTS BEGIN TO THINK 
LOGICALLY? 
The scheme of evaluation of the ability to think 
logically which was used has been developed and 
verified by a Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, 
during many years' research with children. There 
is, however, no indication that his work has been 
extended to include entering college students, 
particularly American students. In  addition, no 
work can be found with American children which 
verifies his conclusions that children begin to 
think logically between ages 11-15. 
Piagetl found that children progress through 
various stages of mental manipulation and that 
these steps cannot be circumvented. Prior to 
thinking about abstract ideas, a student must 
undergo a period of physical manipulation of 
objects using the basic principles upon which the 
abstraction to be developed depends. This stage 
Piaget identifies as the concrete stage of thought. A 
student may handle concepts quite adequately, but 
until he has had many manipulative experiences 
he cannot recognize those concepts in the context 
of a broader generalization, of which the manipula- 
tive experiences and the concepts are simply a 
subset. Inhelder and Piaget2 found that from 11- 
15 years of age most Swiss children should become 
formal operational, i.e., capable of abstract logical 
t,hought. The concern of this research was wbet,her 
McKinnon3 studied responses to tasks given 
131 members of the freshman class a t  an Oklahoma 
university in which students had to think 
logically about problems of volume conservation, 
reciprocal implication of two factors, the elimina- 
tion of a contradiction, the separation of several 
variables, and the exclusion of irrelevant variables 
from those relevant to problem solutions. These 
tasks had initially been developed by Inhelder and 
Piaget2 for determining the patterns of thought of 
children and the ages at  which changes in those 
thought patterns occur. 
Table I presents the test results for these 131 
students using the foregoing tasks and the criteria 
specified by Inhelder and Piaget for demonstrating 
formal operational thought. Each student was 
graded from 0 through 4 on each of the tasks. 
Should a student score a total of 14 or more points 
on the five tasks, he was judged as definitely being 
at  the formal operational stage. To achieve 14 
points, he had to score a t  least 3 points an the 
FIG. 1. A comparison of ACT score versus Piagetian score 
for 94 freshman students. 
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tasks for \vhiclz 4 points were possible. If a student 
scored an average of 2 points or less on each of the 
five taslis, he was judged to be at the concrete 
stage of operations. Those students who scored 
more than 10 but less than 14 points were judged 
to be moving from the concrete stage to the formal 
stage of thought. 
The findings, as sho15-n in Table I, are that 50y0 
of the entering college students tested were 
operating completely a t  Piaget's concrete level of 
thought and another 25% had not fully attained 
the established criteria for formal thought. The 
average score for all students was 10.74, with the 
males scoring significantly higher than females. 
An examination of the performance of the students 
on the various tasks used follows: 
1. Of the college freshmen tested, 17% of them 
did not conserve quantity (the result of a change 
of form), while another 10% failed to recognize 
equivalence of volume. Thus, 27% of those 
students tested were a t  the lowest concrete 
operational state or less. 
2. Reciprocal implication involved the student 
in the problem of reflecting a ball and the necessity 
to relate incident and reflected angles. This task 
\%-as ecoi7d only to the problem of density in the 
number of failures recorded-64% scored 2 or less. 
3. The elimination of a contradict ion involved 
the student in relating weight and volume of 
floating and sinking objects in a meaningful way. 
More than $ of those tested did not relate weight 
and volume. Typically. they recognized weight 
only. Seldom was there a proportionality ex- 
pressed; 67% of the students tested on this task 
were concrete operational. 
4. The separation of variables task gave 
evidence that 50% of entering college freshmen 
could not recognize tlze action of a potential 
variable and find a way to prove the action of that 
variable. 
.5. The task of excluding irrelevant variables 
showed that 33% of the students tested could not 
eliminate variables of no consequence in a swing- 
ing pendulum, while another 18% could do no 
more than order the effects of weight. 
1.) A graph of these two scores sho~vs that 
Pearson product-moment correlations were high 
for those students scoring a t  the average ACT 
composite of 22 or better, but correlations of 
-0.05 were found for students scoring less than 
that average. The university where this study was 
made ranks high in terms of the average ACT 
scores when compared with all other colleges and 
universities in Oklahoma4 and is well above 
average for all regions of the United  state^.^ 
P,lmost 75y0 of that university's entering fresh- 
men, however, were either partially or conipletely 
concrete operationaI. What evidence exists, there- 
fore, to demonstrate that logical thought can be 
promoted among all levels of students? 
CAN INQUIRY-ORIENTED COURSES 
PROMOTE LOGICAL THOUGHT? 
The University of Oklahoma Science Education 
Center has, for some time! been investigating t.he 
effects of inquiry-oriented teaching upon both 
teachers and pupils. Various new courses in science 
wiliich utilize the inquiry approach have been 
evaluated. Porterfield6 compared teachers of 
reading who had inquiry educational experiences 
in science with t,hose who had not. He found t,hat 
the former tended to use more questions requiring 
analysis and synthesis and other high-level 
cognitive thought patterns than did the latter 
group. Wilson7 found much the same in a study of 
30 classes of elementary children when fift,een of 
the teachers had been exposed to inquiry experi- 
ences in science and fifteen had not. Schmidt8 
found similar results by investigating t,he teaching 
in social studies done by teachers who had and had 
not been involved with inquiry in science. Friot9 
found in astudy of seventh, eighth, and ninth grade 
science t'hat courses placing emphasis upon the 
inquiry approach allom7ed students to be able to 
function at  a much higher level of logical thouglit, 
than those courses in which students did not have 
that inquiry experience. 
Stafford used the development of conservation 
reasoning in children as an evaluative tool to 
determine whether or not inquiry-oriented science 
experiences move first graders toward the acquisi- 
In  the research, a comparison was made of the tion of concrete operational thought. The specific 
score obtained by each student on the various unit he used was Material Objects.10 Stafford 
Piagetian tasks given him and this score was cor- found: ". . . those first grade children who have 
related with his ACT composite score. (See Fig. experiences with the unit achieved the ability to 
B J P  Volume 39 / 1049 
TABLE 11. A comparison of the growth in logical thought processes of the experimental and control groups 
- 
Pre-test Post-test Net gain 
Group Stage Females Males Females Males Females Males Total 
Experimental Formal 4 11 14 16 10 5 15 
Post-concret e 14 6 17 8 3 2 5 
Concrete 24 10 11 3 - 13 - 7 - 20 
Control Formal 4 14 7 17 3 3 6 
Post-concrete 6 6 11 7 5 1 6 
Concrete 26 6 18 2 - 8 -4 - 12 
conserve much more rapidly than did those 
children who did not have these experiences."" 
Material Objects is an inquiry-centered unit and 
Stafford concluded: ". . . children so taught do 
show more rapid intellectual development than do 
those children not having such experiences."ll 
Finally, McKinnon,I2 in a study of the effect of 
an inquiry-centered science course on entry into 
the formal operational stage of concrete opera- 
tional freshman college students, found a highly 
significant difference between those students 
enrolled in the course and a like group who had not 
been exposed to the course. 
The data of Table I gave evidence of the ability 
of students to think logically. The data of Table I1 
show the effect of the inquiry-centered course 
upon freshman students' ability to thinli logically. 
A net gain in favor of the experimental group 
resulted in 15 students moving into the formal 
stage of thought-compared with six for the 
control group. The post-concrete gain was, 
respectively, five and six, with the experimental 
group showing a net movement of 20 out of this 
category compared with 12 for the control group, 
a net gain of more than 50% for the group exposed 
to the influence of the new science course. The 
ina.teria1 of the science course did not include 
references to the tasks which were part of the test 
level of confidence; therefore, the hypothesis must 
be accepted that a properly designed course in 
science for freshman college students does enhance 
their logical thought patterns by increasing their 
ability to hypothesize, verify, restructure, syn- 
thesize, and predict. 
The preceding research gives evidence that 
students do not thinli logically. However, research 
carried out on newly developed courses does give 
evidence that the logical thought processes can be 
enhanced. Therefore, m7ho is a t  fault and what 
steps must be taken to alleviate the situation? 
AN EVALUATION O F  EDUCATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY USING THE INQUIRY 
APPROACH 
If students do not think logically when tlley 
enter college, who has not discharged his responsi- 
bility? The immediate answer to the foregoing 
question is, the high school. That answer, however, 
needs to be examined. 
Piaget states formal operations begin to emerge 
around 11 years of age But Friotg found that 82% 
of eighth and ninth grade children (ages 13 and 14 
years) were still concrete operational. Thus, 
children probably enter senior high school two to 
three years behind the age set by Piaget for 
instruments; therefore, changes in ability to think 
caused by added for TABLE 111. Pre-test and post-test Piagetian mean scores for both experimental and control groups. inquiry. Another comparison in terms of the mean 
Piagetian scores for the two groups is shown in Group Experimental Control 
Table 111. n Piaget score n Piaget score 
After obtaining individual pre-test-post-test 
- 
differences and summing them up for each group, Pre-t,est 69 10.77 62 10.81 
an F ratio of 6.24 was obtained. This value is Post-test 6Y 12,32 62 11.14 
significant in favor of the test group a t  the 0.001 
1050 / September 1971 
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entering into formal operation. While some of this 
age difference might be attributed to differences 
in the samples of Piaget and Friot, the entire 82% 
cannot be. The answer to the question of who is 
responsible for the lag in intellectual development 
seems t,o be the elementary school. But that 
answer, too, needs to be examined. 
Begin that examination with another question. 
Who is teaching in the elementary and secondary 
schools? Teachers who have been educated in the 
existing colleges and universities. Those teachers 
have been subjected to four years of mainly 
listening experience. They have been lectured to, 
told to verify, given answers, and told how to 
teach. Lest you think the foregoing happens 
entirely in the colleges and/or depart'ments of 
education, remind yourself that all the con,tent taken 
by  a teacher (which represents a substantially 
greater number of credit hours than do courses in 
education) is taken in other colleges and/or 
departments. Teachers are, in other words, not 
having the kinds of experiences with inquiry which 
Piaget says they must have in order to allow 
logical thought processes to develop. Future 
teachers are not having learning experiences in 
college which mill permit them to learn the value 
of inquiry in educating a child. The foregoing 
rather dogmatic statement was substantiated by 
Gruber13 when he found that only 25% of those 
attending NSE' Institutes showed interest in 
inquiry-oriented science heaching, while Torrance14 
found that only 1.4% of elementary and 8.4% of 
seconda,ry social studies teachers listed inde- 
pendent and critical thinking as important educa- 
tional objectives. These stat'istics suggest that 
pre-college teacl~ers place little value upon logical 
thought as an outcome of 12 years of schooling. 
Considering the paucity of research on imple- 
mentatlion of logical thought as an educational 
objective, these educators' values will not change. 
The responsibility, t,hen, for the small percentage 
of high school students at'taining formal operations 
rest's in part a t  the door of the inst'itutions of higher 
education. They have assumed that their role is to 
t>ell. Future teachers, therefore, assume t>hat 
telling is teaching and when they get their first 
class, t'hey tell, tell, t'ell! All the while, very little, 
if any, intellectual development is going on. If, 
then, a college student develops logical t,houglit, 
such development is more by accident than design. 
One of the criteria Piaget cites for intellectual 
development is that of social transmission. Just 
possibly more intellectual development goes on in 
dorms, fraternities, s~rorit~ies, and student hang- 
owts than in the classroonn because social trans- 
mission occurs in these pla,ces and lit'tle occurs in 
cla,sses. To test our assertions, m-all< down the hall 
of any building on any campus and stop outside 
an:y classroom door and listmen to who is talking. 
In most instances only information is being trans- 
mitted by the in~truct~or. 
Stafford and Renner" hypothesized that 
". . . specialized educational experiences in in- 
quiry-centered science teaching encourage a 
tea,cher to become sensitive to children, function- 
ally aware of the purposes of education, and 
equipped to lead children to learn 1101~ to learn in 
all subject areas." The importance of this hy- 
pol.hesis is in the phrase " . . . all subject areas.", 
for inquiry methodology is not only the province 
of science, but all t,he other disciplines as well. 
Unfortunately, few other tea,ching areas have 
recognized the importance of the inquiry approach. 
'rNith t'he exception of a fexv new courses in t'he 
social science areas, most educators have chosen 
to ignore the lead taken by science and mathe- 
matics in devising new courses from kindergart.er1 
through the 12th grade. 111 many cases, the col- 
leges have failed to use inquiry even when 
teaching t,he new curricula,. This point was \$-ell 
illustrated by Gruber. Therefore, the blame must, 
in the last analysis, be placed, a t  least partially, 
upon the shoulders of those who t'eacli a t  the 
college level and who insist upon ignoring the 
rapidly accumulat,ing evidence in favor of tlie 
inquiry approach. 
Renner and St'afford also pointed to the neces- 
sity of the teacher becoming ". . . functionally 
aware of t'he purposes of education . . ." which in 
far too many cases they are not now. Unless 
teachers are aware of the prima,ry purpose of 
education being t'he development of Ilie learner's 
intellectual ability, t'hey will not pursue teaching 
by giving the student opportunities for explora- 
tion using all his senses. Rather, they will continue 
to teach students what t'he teacher want's them to 
know and not what the students want to learn. 
Finally, the total accumulat,ion of research to 
date leads to the following hypotheses: (1) The 
secondary educational experience does not no\\- 
AJP  Volume 39 
promote logical thinking in most students. (2) An 
abundance of inquiry-oriented courses taught by 
teachers who are products of college and university 
professors who practice and profess inquiry must 
come into being in the secondary schools before an 
alternative to the first hypothesis can be accepted. 
Those experiences will have to be developed by 
many colleges. 
Those hypotheses have profound educational 
implications since a serious problem has been 
shown to exist and the means for its alleviation 
have also been shown to be available to the 
profession. If colleges and universities do not 
try to solve the problem by assuming the re- 
sponsibility for the intellectual development of 
their students, but continue to look a t  their 
primary purpose as the transmission of informa- 
tion about the several disciplines, the elementary 
and secondary schools mill continue to fail in their 
mission of truly educating  student,^. The needed 
changes, however, can come only through accept- 
ance of inquiry by all of those who teach the 
teachers. 
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Radiation Field of a Charge Moving on a Straight Line 
J. 0. ALEVISOS We derive the radiation field of an accelerating 
Varvakion Arormal School point charge from the following assumptions: 
Athens, Greece (1) electric effects are transmitted with the 
(Received 11 September 1970; revised 21 April 1971) velocity c ;  (2) Gauss' law holds good in all 
inertial frames of reference; (3) the electric field 
A derivation of the radiation field of a charge ac- a charge is known. 
celerating o n  a straight line i s  presented that makes use of These are the assumptions made by J. R. 
Gauss' law in a direct manner and does not make use of Tessman and J. T. Finnell to derive the radiation 
the concept of lines of force. field of a point charge moving on a straight line. 
However, we shall not make use of the concept of 
lines of force, and Gauss' law shall be used in a 
most direct way. 
Consider the following kinematic sequence on a 
straight line of a particle with the charge q:  
(a) The charge moves with constant velocity 
vl until t = to. At t = to we designate its position by 
0. 
(b) The charge moves with constant velocity 
v2 thereafter. We only suppose that UI, v2 are less 
than c. 
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Piagetian Theory 
and Instruction in Physics 
John W. Renner and Anton E. Lawson 
Jean Piaget and his associates have been gathering data and formulating 
important theoretical observations about the intellectual development 
of children since 1927. Although it has taken American psychologists 
and educators a relatively long time to become acquainted with his 
work, it is becoming apparent that we can gain much by a careful eval- 
uation of his efforts and their educational implications. 
Numerous texts1 have become available in recent years attempting to 
explain Piaget's theory and its educational significance. The primary 
purpose of this paper is similarly to explain his ideas, and further to 
expand a scheme of instruction and classroom procedures that arise as 
a consequence of that theory.' When possible these ideas will be put 
forth using examples in physics context in an effort to elucidate 
difficult ideas. 
Mental Structures 
A central idea in Piaget's work and fundamental in understanding his 
theory is the concept of mental structure. It would be satisfying to be 
able to indicate the physiological and chemical nature of these struc- 
tures, but at this point in the study of human mental functioning that 
is not possible.3 Instead their existence in the brain is hypothesized 
from observable behavior; determination of their exact nature awaits 
further research. These hypothesized mental structures function to or- 
ganize the environment so that the organism can function effectively. 
In this sense the construction of these structures carries adaptive value 
for the individual. An analogous situation is found in the genetic adap- 
tation of evolving species. Basically, then, mental structures represent a 
more or less tightly organized mental system to guide behavior. 
During development of the human infant to adulthood, these structures 
must be built within the brain. A complete developmental sequence of 
the structures is not genetically given to the child; they must be learned. 
According to Piaget, the building and rebuilding of these mental struc- 
tures is what underlies the process of intellectual development. These 
structures control how and what we think and guide behavior. In other 
words, structures actually represent our knowledge. 
Since science educators are deeply concerned with intellectual develop- 
ment and the building of mental structures about everything from the 
metric system to the theory of relativity, two questions need to be 
asked: (1) How are structures built? (2) Once the structure is built 
is it static or can it be altered? 
These two questions are not mutually exclusive, and we will answer the 
second one first. Structures can be altered, and that may be a more than 
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adequate definition of education-the building and rebuild- 
of structures. The answer to the first question should then 
give us good insights into how learning takes place and how 
instruction should be planned. 
The Building of Mental Structures - A Problem 
An important point must be made before examining the 
process by which mental structures are formed according to 
Piaget. Structures do not come from simply making a men- 
tal record of the world by keeping eyes and ears open. Un- 
fortunately, it would appear that many teachers subscribe 
to this view. Work done by Van Senden with congenitally 
blind persons provides an interesting example of this point.4 
These persons, who had gained sight after surgery, could 
not identify objects without handling them. They were un- 
able to distinguish a key from a book, when both lay on a 
table. Also they were unable to report seeing any difference 
between a square and a circle. The important idea to  note is 
this: Whether the task is to simply distinguish objects in the 
environment or complex relationships such as F=ma, ac - 
celeration, or velocity, the ability to develop the under. 
standings requires much more than a simple photographing 
of the environment. 
According to Piaget a person is unable to  perceive things un- 
til his mind has a structure which enables its perception. 
Without the development of a mental structure things which 
seem obvious to an adult, such as the difference between a 
key and a book, a square and a circle, are simply not per- 
ceived by beginners. But this leads us to a fundamental 
problem. If learning is the building or rebuilding of mental 
structures, and if structures are needed in order to  perceive 
and learn and are not derived from simply copying the ex- 
ternal world, then where do they come from? 
Plato's answer to this question was simple. The structures 
were innate and developed through the passage of time and 
the growth of the brain. Of course at the other end of the 
spectrum is the belief that these structures derived directly 
from the environment. This is the classical empiricist's view; 
but we have already seen that this view is untenable. 
Piaget rejects the Platonic view, except to admit that cer- 
tain very primary structures must be present at birth. 
Piaget's view is that the development of structures derives 
from a dynamic interaction of the organism and the environ- 
ment which he calls equilibration. 
The Building of Mental Structures - Equilibration 
From birth, basic structures enable the child to  begin inter- 
acting with his surroundings. As long as that interaction is 
successful the basic structures continue to guide behavior. 
However, owing to the child's inborn drive to interact with 
his environment he meets contradictions, i.e., things which 
do not fit his present mental structures. These contradic- 
tions produce a state of disequilibrium. In other words, his 
present mental structures are disrupted and must be re- 
placed. Through continued investigation and guidance from 
others, the child alters or accommodates his disrupted men- 
tal structure. Once this is accomplished he is then able to 
assimilate the new situation. The new structure that is de- 
veloped is then tried. If the structure guides behavior so that 
the child's efforts are rewarded (reinforced) the structure is 
also reinforced. In this manner the child builds new mental 
structures and adapts to  new situations. 
The above-described process underlies all development ac- 
cording to theory. The entire process of development of 
mental structures is viewed as a process of equilibration or 
self-regulation. This process results in the development of 
progressively more complex and useful mental structures. 
The Building of Mental Structures - Contributing Factors 
The role of three main factors, experience, social trans- 
mission, and maturation can be isolated in the process of 
equilibration. I t  is apparent that experience is a necessary 
part of learning. With no contact with the environment, no 
contradictions of present structures arise and no possibility 
for further exploration into the situation that produced the 
contradiction is possible. 
There are basically two kinds of experience ---- physical, and 
logical-mathematical. This distinction is important because 
the different experiences lead to different kinds of mental 
structures. 
Physical experience is exactly what the phrase connotes - 
actual physical action on the objects in the world. This 
physical experience leads to the development of structures 
about objects. At some point, however, the learner begins 
to  see more in his interaction with the world than just ob- 
jects. He sees that his actions with objects produce some 
kind of order themselves. An example of this is when a 
learner discovers that ten objects, when counted left to 
right provide the same result as when counted right to left. 
In other words, the action itself has properties. The learner 
now can make the generalization that the sum of any set of 
objects is independent of their order. Now the student has 
a mental structure that he can utilize in many situations and 
that is a logical-mathematical structure. The structures 
then enable the learner to  operate logically within his en- 
vironment. The basic behavioral patterns directed by the 
mental structure are called operations. In the early structure- 
building stages the opportunity for the learner to  interact 
with concrete material is mandatory. 
Piaget has not projected to what academic level the neces- 
sity for interaction with material exists; he says, "...coordi- 
nation of actions before the stage of operations needs to be 
supported by concrete material."5 A literal interpretation 
of that statement would be that, regardless of age, the stu- 
dent must have materials to perform actions with until he 
can begin to utilize logical-mathematical operations. Our 
research with kindergarten and elementary school children: 
junior high school  student^,^ and college freshmeq8 all 
studying science, supports our interpretation of the fore- 
going quotation. 
The factor of experience, then, helps students to build op- 
erational-structures which can ultimately lead them to think 
abstractly about the world around them. In other words, it 
is experience with the materials of the discipline that pro- 
duces the person who can understand abstract content and 
not studying abstract content which produces students who 
can interact with the materials and invent abstract general- 
izations. This says to science teachers that the laboratory 
must precede the introduction of an abstract generalization. 
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Fig. 1 .  Jean Piaget. Photograph 
by the Science Curriculum 
Improvement Study. 
Piaget's second factor, social transmission, also provides a 
basis for structure building. The very young child - and 
some not so young - operate from a very egocentric frame 
of reference. He cannot see things objectively because he 
always looks at them as related to himself. Such a thinker 
cannot objectively view and/or evaluate anything. In order 
to shake the learner from an egocentric view of anything, he 
must experience the viewpoints and thoughts of others. He 
must, in other words, interact with other people. If he does 
not, he has no reason to alter the mental structures which 
he gained from an egocentric frame of reference. Social 
interaction can lead to conflict, debate, shared data, and the 
clear delineation and expression of ideas. All of these re- 
quire that the student carefully examine his present beliefs 
which will, according to the Piagetian model, develop and 
change structures. In  order to  have all of this happen, how- 
ever, students must be encouraged to talk with each other 
and their teachers. Data from an experiment must be shared, 
discussed, retaken, and rediscussed. Students, "...should 
converse, share experience, and a r g ~ e . " ~  The factor of 
social interaction is valuable in building and rebuilding 
structures, but it is insufficient because the learner c& re- 
ceive valuable infornlation via language or via education di- 
rected by an adult only if he is in a state where he can under- 
stand this information. That is, to receive this information 
he must have a set of experiences that enables him to assim- 
ilate this information. 
Marurarion, the third factor, must also be considered. Evi- 
dence indicates that these structures require time to  de- 
velop. Old structures cannot be accommodated to new ex- 
periences a l l  at once. The process of development is slow, 
as any teacher can attest. 
Perhaps this personal example will help clarify how these 
three factors interact in the process of equilibration to 
change structures. Our first contact with V=IR was a 
rather traumatic experience. We vaguely understood that it 
involved the conservation of energy, but concentrated upon 
memorizing what the symbols meant and how to juggle the 
formula. In short, an advanced state of disequilibrium was 
our lot! When meter readings were substituted for the very 
abstract terms of potential difference and current, the sym- 
bols began to have meaning, and after a good deal of think- 
ing equilibrium was achieved. Then a series circuit with one 
source and more than one resistor and parallel circuit was 
introduced. The notion that in a series circuit the total 
potential difference, Vt ,  of the source equaled the sum of 
all voltage drops, Vi, i =  1,2,3,..n, around the circuit brought 
on another disequilibration. Once again meter reading (ob- 
jects) were salvation; we began to  really understand that 
really was a conservation of energy statement. Now V=ZR 
was a concept which was available for use and once again 
equilibrium was achieved. Parallel circuits presented no 
problem and Kirchhoff's laws were nearly obvious. 
This example demonstrates that the science laboratory 
clearly has a place in promoting equilibration and disequil- 
ibration. Data from an experiment can be very threatening, 
because they too often produce disequilibrium. But to the 
sensitive, concerned science teacher, disequilibrium is an 
opportunity; he can now introduce the student to  the major 
conceptualizations of the discipline which will produce 
- 
equilibrium. This sequence of events suggests that perhaps 
the principal role of the teacher is to promote disequilibrium 
and equilibrium, because through the process of equil- 
ibration structures are built and rebuilt. Equilibration pro- 
ceeds through experience with the materials worked with 
and the social interaction of those around us. 
The Learning Cycle 
An instructional technique incorporating much of Piagetian 
theory has been developed and refined by the Science Cur- 
riculum Improvement Study, University of California, 
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Berkeley. Their procedure is basically a three-phase process: 
(1) exploration, (2) invention, and (3) discovery. 
Exploration involves the students in concrete experience 
with materials. As a consequence of these initial explora- 
tions, which sometimes may be highly structured by the 
teacher or on other occasions relatively free, the learner 
encounters new information which does not fit his existing 
structures. This produces disequilibrium. At the appropriate 
time, determined by the teacher, he suggests a way of order- 
ing the experiences. In essence, the teacher invents a new 
structure which often involves a new concept. This phase, 
termed invention, is analogous to Piaget's structure building 
and promotes a new state of understanding or equilibrium. 
The question now is: Can the new situation be applied in 
other situations? During phase three, discovey, further ap- 
plication of the inventions are discovered by the students. 
Discovery experiences serve to reinforce, refine, and enlarge 
the content of the invention.1° 
Again an example from physics may help to clarify these 
points. Experience in the laboratory with voltage and re- 
sistance, seeing the effect these have on current, and record- 
ing all these data is exploration. These exploratory experi- 
ences, if provided at the appropriate time, will promote dis- 
equilibrium and lead students to question relationships. 
Since it would take a brilliant student to invent the notion 
that V=IR , the formal statement of that relationship is left 
up to the teacher. The teacher, having explained the re- 
lationship, has in effect provided a way of ordering the stu- 
dent's experience. This is invention. Now the student is in a 
position to make discovery with this new concept. He can 
apply it to various types of circuits, magnitudes of voltage, 
current, and resistance, practically any type of situation he 
can design. That is the true notion of discovery. Explora- 
tion, invention, and discovery are the three phases of the 
learning cycle and represent a process which will lead the 
learner to move from physical action to abstract mental 
operations. Science in general - and in our opinion physics 
in particular - has a unique opportunity to lead students 
to build structures. Are we utilizing it? There is much evi- 
dence to suggest we are not." 
Levels of T'hinking 
Piaget's theory has gone further than describing how mental 
structures are formed. He has outlined the basic structures 
that dictate behavior from birth to adulthood. The struc- 
tures fall roughly into four categories. Each category or 
stage incorporates and adds to the structure of the previous 
stages. If Piaget is correct, it becomes imperative for edu- 
cators to understand these stages of development. They pro- 
vide a possible key for adapting instruction to the learner's 
capabilities. They further suggest types of activities 
which could promote intellectual development. 
The child at birth is in a state Piaget calls sensoy-motor. 
During this period, which lasts until about 18 months, the 
child acquires such practical knowledge as the fact that ob- 
jects are permanent. The name of the second stage describes 
the characteristics of the child - preoperational, the stage of 
intellectual development before mental operations appear. 
In this stage, which persists until around seven years of age, 
the child does not, for example, reverse his thinking; he 
exhibits extreme egocentricism, centers his attention upon 
a particular aspect of a given object, event, or situation, 
reasons transductively, and does not demonstrate conser- 
vation'* reasoning. In other words, the child's thinking is 
very rigid. 
At about seven years of age the thinking stages of children 
begin to "thaw put" - they show less rigidity. The stage the 
child has entered is called concrete operational Those struG 
tures which permit the reversal of thinking et al., which are 
denied a pre-operational thinker, begin to show themselves 
as the child moves more and more deeply into the concrete 
operational stage. The child can now perform what Piaget 
calls mental experiments - he can assimilate data from a 
concrete experience and arrange and rearrange them in his 
head. In other words, the concrete operational child has a 
much greater mobility of thought than when he was 
younger. 
The name of this stage of development - concrete opera- 
tional - is representative of the type of thinking of this type 
of learner. As Piaget explains this stage: "The operations 
involved ... are called 'concrete' because they related directly 
to objects and not yet to verbally stated hypotheses."'3 In 
other words, the mental operations performed at this stage 
are "object bound" - operations are tied to objects. This 
point must be firmly entrenched in the minds of teachers, 
because when working with students who are moving 
though this stage they must focus their teaching on the 
object - the actuality - and not on the abstract. Density, 
for example, is an abstraction - lenses are concrete. 
As the child begins to emerge from the concrete operational 
stage of thought, according to the Piagetian model, he 
enters the last stage called formal operational. According 
to Piaget, this occurs between 11 and 15 years of age. A 
person who has entered that stage of formal thought "...is 
an individual who thinks beyond the present and forms 
theories about everything, delighting especially in consider- 
ations of that which is not."14 Formal operational thought 
is capable of reasoning with propositions only and has no 
need for objects. It should be pointed out, however, that 
for this type of thought to occur it must be developed 
through the use of objects. For that reason this type of 
thought can be described as propositional logic. An analysis 
of formal operations reveals that they "...consist, essentially 
of 'implication' ... and 'contradiction' established between 
propositions which themselves express classifications, seria- 
tations, etc."15 The formal thinker can form hypotheses and 
test them:To do this, he must isolate and control variables 
and exclude irrelevant ones. This type of thought can truly 
be described as abstract. 
The maximum educational gain that comes from the study 
of science is derived from the isolation and investigation of 
a problem. Quite obviously this involves the formulation 
and stating of hypotheses and using a form of thinking 
which can be described as, if ..., then ,..., therefore. That is, 
of course, propositional logic. In other words, science 
teaching should promote formal thought. But it cannot do 
so if concrete operational thinkers are asked to interact 
with science on a fonnal operational level and their teacher 
teaches them as though they think formally. Concrete opera- 
tional learners must interact with science at that level; they 
cannot do otherwise. Only then will they build the struc- 
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tures that promote their intellectual development toward 
formal thought. 
Where are today's science students in the development of 
formal thought? If the programs of study available for high 
school physics are examined, for example, the fact that 
they require the use of abstract thinking is immediately ap- 
parent. The same can be said for most of the new curricu- 
lum developments in science. As Kohlberg and Gilligan re- 
cently said: "Clearly the new curricula assumed formal 
operational thought rather than attempting to develop it."16 
Is such a statement justified? Can science taught at the 
pre-collegiate and college levels promote formal thought? 
What can teachers do, if anything, as they select and arrange 
curricula and interact with students to promote formal 
thought? A later article in this journal will address itself to 
those questions. 
[The second part of this article will appear in the May issue 
of The Physics Teacher.] 
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Promoting Intellectual Development 
Through Science Teaching 
John Wm Renner and Anton E m  Lawson 
The previous article in this series, ["Piagetian Theory and Instruction in 
Physics," Phys. Teach. 11, 165 (1973)J discussed the process of intel- 
lectual development and the intellectual level concepts of Jean Piaget 
and briefly commented upon the relation of those ideas to teaching and 
learning physics. The purpose of this article is to comment upon the 
thought patterns of secondary school and first-year college students and 
to suggest types of experiences students need to have to enable them to 
move toward acquiring formal thought. 
We start with the assumption that all students deserve the opportunity 
to develop the capacity to think with the "If ..., then ..., therefore ..." 
form - in other words, to develop formal thought. Three questions 
immediately arise: 
(1) What type(s) of thought do secondary school and first year 
college students use? 
(2) How can the student's level-of-thought be assessed? 
(3) What can educational institutions do to change the type(s) of 
thinking students do? 
Levels of Thought, Students, and Content 
If you reflect back to the first article we prepared on the topic of learn- 
ing, you will recall that we pointed out that learners begin to leave the 
pre-operational stage at around seven years of age. At this point, they 
enter the concrete operational stage of thought and, according to Piaget, 
move more and more deeply into that stage until somewhere between 
1 1 and 15 years of age. That is the time when they begin to move into 
the last stage of intellectual development - formal operational thought. 
Now the transition from concrete to formal thought is of the utmost 
importance to teachers who work with students in grades 10-1 2 in the 
secondary schools and in their first years of college. If students have 
achieved the ability to think formally, the teacher can proceed to lead 
them to  deal in the great abstractions of science because they can think 
with form, "if ..., then ..., therefore ...," or propositional logic. These 
teachers need not be as concerned with providing students direct ex- 
perience with the materials of the discipline as those teaching concrete 
operational thinkers. But if students are concrete operational, they can- 
not think with propositional logic and all they learn will come from 
interacting with the materials of the discipline. These statements carry 
with them serious implications for science teaching, indeed for all types 
of teaching which deal with abstractions. Therefore, the validity of 
these statements must be carefully evaluated. At this particular time 
such an evaluation has not been carried out to any satisfactory extent. 
However, to any teacher who has had the experience of having his stu- 
dents simply not comprehend what to him seemed eminently clear, 
Piaget's hypothesis becomes extremely compelling. 
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Basically one can gasp why Piaget asserts that "if ..., then ..., 
therefore,.." thinking is required to understand abstract 
concepts if you understand the nature of the abstract con- 
cepts themselves. The abstractions in physics, as well as in 
biology and chemistry, are in actuality models created by 
scientists to explain observable data. These models do not 
arise directly from the observations; rather, they simply 
represent attempts to construct an explanation or model 
which implies what is observed. The scientist creates the 
model (we do not know how) and reasons ifhis model is 
true, then consequences should be found. If the predicted 
consequences are indeed found, he has therefore supported 
his model. The process is hypotheticodeductive or in the 
if ..., then ..., therefore ... form. For a student to fully grasp 
the meaning of the abstract models he, too, must be able 
to think in the if ..., then ..., therefore ... form. The inertia 
principle, for example, has to be deduced and verified 
from its implied consequences. Strictly speaking, it does 
not give rise to observable empirical evidence. 
Consider Newton's second law, F = ma. That law is always 
stated (and properly so) in terms of the mass of a body. 
Now mass is not a concrete concept - it is an abstraction. 
All matter that students have experienced exists in a gravi- 
tational field. Therefore what students have experienced is 
not mass but weight. This point is of little consequence to 
a formal operational thinker; mass is an abstract concept 
he can comprehend and do mental experiments with. To 
succeed in understanding F = ma (particularly when iden- 
tifying its units) however, the learner must be able to do 
mental experiments with abstract concepts. Now look at 
acceleration - a rate of change of a rate of change. A rate 
of change is a concrete concept; miles/hour, cents/pound, 
and poundslfoot are all situations with which a learner can 
have concrete experiences. But when you change that rate 
of change so that you are referring to miles/hour/second, 
providing experience which will lead a student to that is 
nearly impossible. (To make acceleration even more ab- 
stract, it is usually written, for example, as ftlsec?) About 
the best that can be done is to let the student experience 
the fact that as an object slows down, the time intervals re- 
quired to travel equal distances gef progressively longer. 
Now consider the experience students have had with forces. 
Those experiences have no doubt been pushes and pulls and 
have probably been measured in pounds. Now a student 
takes an abstract quantity (mass) which he has not experi- 
enced and multiplies it by a second very abstract quantity 
(acceleration) and produces a third quantity called force. 
But here the force is not measured in pounds but in kilo- 
gram-meters/second2 and is called a newton. There is noth- 
ing concrete about that entire process. It is a complete ab- 
straction. Now if a student is a formal thinker, he can prob- 
ably handle that abstraction - he can't ifhe is concrete op- 
erational. Do not misread can't to mean "doesn't want to"; 
it means exactly what it says, can't. 
Couple Newton's second law with the calorie, transverse 
waves, the particle theory of light, the gauss and maxwell, 
and the second law of thermodynamics and you have a 
pretty good sampling of a first-year physics course. You 
also have a fair list of abstractions. Those are abstract topics 
for which formal operations are a necessity. How does a 
teacher determine whether or not his class can handle such 
abstract topics? 
Assessing Student Level of Thought 
What we have done in the area of determining student suc- 
cess with tasks which reflect formal operational thought 
has been greatly influenced by four sources: 
1. Bgirbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of 
Logical TPlinking From Childhood to Adolescence (Basic 
Books, New York, 1958), Chaps. 1-7. 
2. m e  Developmental meory of Piaget: Conservation 
(John Davidson Film Producers, San Francisco, 1969). 
3. Elizabeth F. Karplus and Robert Karplus, "Intel- 
lectual Development Beyond the Elementary School: I. 
Deductive Logic," [School Sci. Math. LXX, 398 (May 
1970)l. 
4. Robert Karplus and Rita W. Peterson, "Intellectual 
Development Beyond Elementary School 11: Ratio A 
Survey," [School Sci. Math. LXX, 813 (Dec. 1970)l. 
The foregoing sources contain many more tasks than will 
be described here, and you are urged to try them. Here are 
two tasks which we have used quite extensively. 
( 1 )  The Conservation of Volume (Source 2, above). 
This task requires two cylinders of exactly the same size but 
having different weight (we have used one made of brass 
and the other of aluminum); those properties of the cylin- 
ders are pointed out to the student. He is next presented 
with two identical tubes partially filled with water and al- 
lowed to adjust the water levels until he is convinced that 
each tube contains exactly the same amount. The student 
is then asked if when the cylinders are put in the tubes, the 
heavy cylinder will push the water up more, if the lighter 
cylinder will push the level up more, or if the cylinders will 
push the levels up the same. The examiner requires the 
student to explain his answer, and often it is the explana- 
tions and not the initial responses that are most reveal- 
ing of thought patterns. If the student completes the task 
successfully, he has provided evidence of beginning formal 
operational thought. 
(2) The Exclusion of Irrelevant variables2 (Source 
1, above). The student is presented with a pendulum whose 
length can be easily changed and three different sized 
weights which can be used for the pendulum bob. He is 
told to do as many experiments as he needs to, using many 
different lengths of string and all the various-sized weights 
until he can explain what he needs to do to make the pen- 
dulum go fast or slow. Again, note that the examiner bases 
his evaluation on the student's explanations. The variables 
of string length, angle, and push are also pointed out to the 
student. If the examinee recognizes that length is the only 
relevant variable, he is about to enter into the formal op- 
erational thought period. If he not only excludes the irrele- 
vant variables but hypothesizes a solution to the problem 
and demonstrates his solution, he has entered the formal 
period. If the student can state a general rule about pendula 
in such a way that it can be tested, he is probably capable 
of working with propositional logic. Although the concept 
of an oscillating pendulum and its period is not an abstract 
concept itself (its discovery and construction related di- 
rectly to a concrete physical experiment), solution of the 
pendulum problem does indicate the use of propositional 
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logic and that is a prerequisite to the understanding of 
 abstraction^.^ 
Student Performance on the Tasks 
Physics is normally taught in the high schools to students 
in grades eleven and twelve. We administered these tasks, 
therefore, to 99 eleventh graders and 97 twelfth graders 
from Oklahoma public schools. The schools were randomly 
selected, and students in each selected school were also 
randomly selected. Table I shows what we found. 
Table I. Performance of formal operational tasks by a ran- 
dom sample of high school students. 
The data in Table I suggest that out of the population from 
which physics students are drawn, not many are formal 
operational. You are urged to administer these tasks to 
your students, If you are interested in doing some group 
evaluations of your students, study sources three and four 
listed earlier. Source three deals with determining student 
ability to reason abstractly by presenting a problem and 
then providing one clue at a time. The clues and the orig- 
inal statement of the problem must then be analyzed and 
used to draw conclusions. Source four assesses student abil- 
ity to apply the concept of ratio. When using ratios, the 
student is utilizing proportional thinking which is an essen- 
tial component of formal thought. Please do not make the 
assumption that by the time students get to physics in high 
school only those who think formally enroll. Our high 
school data from those enrolling in high school physics, 
though not extensive enough to make a definite statement, 
suggest that such is not the case. Data will be presented 
later which show that many concrete operational thinkers 
are found at the first year college level. 
Population 
I 1  th Grade (N=99) 
Females (N=54) 
Males (N=45) 
12th Grade (N=97) 
Females (/V=47) 
Males {N=50) 
Kohlberg and Gilligan report that in a study of the ability 
of 265 persons to perform successfully on the pendulum 
task (exclusion), these results were obtained: 
age 10-15 - 45%; age 21-30 - 65%; 
age 16-20 - 53%; age 45-50 - 57%. 
Conservation 
of volume 
19 
26 
18 
34 
If you assume that performance on the pendulum task is an 
indication that formal operational thought is present, the 
foregoing data suggest what our data do - a large percen- 
tage of the adolescent population is not formal operational. 
Unfortunately, our age ranges and those of Kohlberg and 
Gilligan do not coincide exactly, and so no more definite 
statement can be made from those two groups of data. 
14 
2 3 
16 
20 
The conservation of volume and the pendulum tasks were 
taken by college freshmen. The results shown in Table I1 
were obtained. 
Table I I. Performance of college freshmen for formal 
operational tasks, 
Number of Conservation Exclu- 
COllege freshmen of volume sion 
The data shown in Table I1 clearly reflect that the majority 
of college freshmen have not moved deeply into the formal 
operational stage of thought - 77 of 185 experiencing suc- 
cess on the exclusion task is not too impressive. We do not 
mean to infer that performance on the pendulum task is an 
absolute measure of the achievement of formal operational 
thought. We do mean to infer that performance on these 
tasks is a strong indication of student ability to use propo- 
sitional logic. We tested our inference that these two tasks 
do help isolate formal thinkers - those that use thought 
patterns which are "the stock in trade of the logician, the 
scientist, or the abstract thinker."' In searching for a test 
population we ruled out all quantitative fields because the 
tasks are quantitative in nature. We were reminded that the 
"if,.., then ..., therefore" construct is also the stock in trade 
of the lawyer. In order to survive in the study of law, stu- 
dents have to think mainly on the abstract level. We asked 
several groups of second and third year law students'to react 
to the two tasks we just described. Table 111 reflects our re- 
sults. A total of 66 students reacted to the tasks and 50 of 
them demonstrated formal operational thought. We feel, 
therefore, that these two tasks have a good probability of 
identifying formal thought. 
Table 11 1. Performance of second and third year law 
students on two formal operational tasks. 
What Educational Institutions Can Do 
to Foster Formal Thought 
Our research has shown us that the level of thought of 
junior high school students6 and college freshmen7 can be 
changed by providing them inquiry-centered experiences in 
science. We believe that the principal reason our research 
has shown an increase in the thought levels of students is 
because we accepted t h ~ t  most of them participating in the 
experiments were concrete operational. That put squarely 
Formal 
Operational 
19 
3 1 
Conservation of 
volume (N=22) 
Exclusion of 
irrelevant variables 
(N=44 
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Concrete 
Operational 
3 
13 
upon us the responsibility for providing concrete experi- 
ences with the objects and ideas of the discipline. These 
students were involved in actually creating some knowledge 
of their very own, We know that this was the first time some 
of them had been given that opportunity. We believe that 
actual involvement with the materials and ideas of science 
and being allowed to find out something for themselves ac- 
counts for the movement toward and into formal thought 
which we found. 
Science teachers in general and physics teachers in particu- 
lar have a vehicle at their command that makes active std- 
dent involvement convenient. That vehicle is the laboratory. 
Both of our research studies had the laboratory at its nerve 
center. In the case of the college study that laboratory did 
not too frequently involve hardware and chemicals, but it 
was a place where data were gathered, ideas were honed, 
hypotheses were made and tested, and verifications were 
carried out. That is the true laboratory. 
In teaching the majority of physics courses (both college 
and high school) the laboratory can be used to lead stu- 
dents, through inquiryY8 to develop understandings of the 
concepts to be learned. The teacher, then, has three re- 
sponsibilities to discharge before ever meeting a class: 
(1) Isolate those concepts which, when learned, will 
provide students with an accurate and adequate understand- 
ing of the discipline. The teacher must use his understanding 
of the structure of the discipline in order to select the con- 
cepts, and his goal is to provide the learner with his own un- 
derstanding of the discipline's structure. Textbooks are of 
little help here. 
(2) Find those laboratory investigations which when 
cast in an inquiry framework will, upon completion, allow 
the student to  develop an understanding of the concept be- 
ing considered. Textbooks' are of no help here. 
(3) Make sure the investigations are cast into an in- 
quiry framework and be sure the necessary materials are 
available. 
Now classes start.9 The teacher becomes an asker of ques- 
tions, a provider of materials, a laboratory participant, and 
a class chairman and secretary, Perhaps most importantly, 
he is a discussion leader. He gathers the class together 
(chairman) and solicits the data they have gathered (secre- 
tary). He then lea& a discussion on what the data mean 
(discussion leader). He also makes the necessary conceptual 
inventions at the proper time, decides when discovery can 
take place, and when the present concept needs to be re- 
lated to the next one by exploration. He must also decide 
when exploration of a completely new concept must begin. 
This teacher is not a teller, he is a director of learning. 
Traditional teaching methods embrace the notions that 
(a) teaching is telling, (b) memorization is learning, and 
(c) being able to repeat something on an examination is 
evidence of understanding - those points are the antith- 
esis of inquiry. 
The development of formal thought must become the 
focus of attention of every teacher in the country. The Ed- 
ucational Policies Comrnission said. in 1961. that the 
central purpose of the school must'be to teach students to  
think and they operationally defined thinking.'' Such 
good advice! We would add that the central role of the 
school must be to teach children to think with form not 
objects - in other words, to move students into the stage 
of formal operational thought, Science has the structure 
to enhance greatly the achievement of this objective. We 
must not blow our chances to make a maximum contribu- 
tion to education in general and education in science in 
particular! Let's establish an environment in our classrooms 
that encourages and promotes formal thought! 
References 
1. For a nearly complete picture of one research with formal oper- 
ations, see John W. Renner and Don G. Stafford, Teaching Sci- 
ence in the Secondary School (Harper and Row, New York, 
1972), Appendix A,and Joe W. McKinnon and John W. Renner, 
Amer. J. Phys. 39,1047 (1971). 
2. Renner and Stafford, Ref. 1, p. 294. 
3. Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, f i e  Growth of Logical fiink- 
ing From Childhood t o  Adolescence, (Basic Books, New York, 
1958), Chaps. 1-7, p. 309, 
4. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, Daedalus 100,1051 
(Fall 1971); 
5. Jerome S. Bruner, me Process of Education, (Vintage Books, 
New York, 1960), p. 37. 
6. Faith Elizabeth Friot, "The Relationship Between an Inquiry- 
Teaching Approach and Intellectual Development," unpublished 
doctoral dissertation (University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla., 
1970). 
7. Joe W. McKinnon and John W. Renner, Amer. J. Phys. 39, 
1047 (1971). 
8. Refer to John W. Renner and Anton E. Lawson, Phys. Teach. 
11, 165 (1973), under the section "Learning Cycle" for an ex- 
planation of this term and its phases of exploration, invention, 
and discovery. 
9. John W. Renner and Don G. Stafford, Teaching Science in the 
Secondary School (Harper and Row, New York, 1972). This 
book' contains suggestions which will be helpful in classroom im- 
plementation of inquiry. 
10. Educational Policies Comrnission, f i e  Central Purpose o f  Amer- 
ican Education (NEA, Washington, D.C., 1961). 
AAPT SUMMER MEETIIG - 14-16 JU.E 1973 
at the University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada 
THE PHYSICS TEACHER 
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH I N  SCIENCE TEACHING TTOL. 2, PP. 17GlSG (1964) 
PART 1 
Cognitive Development in Children: Piaget 
Development and Learning 
Center for Genetic Epistenzology, Geneva, 
Switzerland 
My dear colleagues, I am very concerned 
about what to say to you, because I do 
not know if I shall accomplish the end that 
has been assigned to me. But I have 
been told that 'the important thing is not 
what you say, but the discussion which 
follows and the answers to questions you are 
asked. So this morning I shall simply 
give a general introduction of a few ideas 
which seem to me to be important for the 
subject of this conference. 
First I would like to make clear the differ- 
ence between two problems: the problem 
of development in general and the problem 
of learning. I think these probleins are 
very different, although some people do not 
make this distinction. 
The development of knowledge is a 
spontaneous process, tied to the whole 
process of embryogenesis. Embryogenesis 
concerns the developnlent of the body, but 
i t  concerns as well the development of the 
nervous system and the development of 
mental functions. In  the case of the devel- 
opment ' of knowledge in children, embry- 
ogenesis ends only in adulthood. It is a 
total developinental process which we must 
re-situate in its general biological and 
psychological context. In  other words, 
development is a process which concerns the 
t.oi.ality of the structures of knowledge. 
Learning presents the opposite case. In 
general, learning is provoked by situations- 
provoked by a psychological experimenter; 
or by a teacher, with respect to some didactic 
point; or by an external situation. It is 
provoked, in general, as opposed to spon- 
l i  
taneous. In addition, it is a limited pro- 
cess-limited to a single problem, or to a 
single structure. 
So I think that developnlent explains 
learning, and this opinion is contrary to 
the widely held opinion that developnlc~lt 
is a sun1 of discrete learning experie~~oes. 
For some psychologists development is 
reduced to a series of specific learned items, 
and development is thus the sum, the cum- 
ulation of this series of specific items. I 
think this is an atomistic view which deforms 
the real state of things. In reality, develop- 
ment is the essential process and cach 
element of learning occurs as a function of 
total development, rather than hang an 
element which explains developnicnt. I 
shall begin, then, with a first part dealing 
with development, and I shall talk about 
learning in the second part. 
To understand the developlnent of l;rloWl- 
edge, we must start with an idea which 
seems central to me-the idea of an 
operation. Knowledge is not a copy of 
reality. To know an object, to ki~ow an 
evenh, is not siniply to look at  it and nlakc 
a mental copy or image of it. To lirlow 
an object is to act on it. To know is to 
modify, to transform the objecl, and t,o 
understand the process of this transfor- 
mation, and as a consequence to under- 
stand the way the object is constructed. 
An operation is thus the essence of lalo~vl- 
edge; it is an interiorized action which 
modifies the object of knowledge For 
instance an operation would co~lsist of 
joining objects in a class to co~lstruc*t a 
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classification. Or an operation would con- 
sist of ordering, or putting things in a 
series. Or an operation would consist of 
counting, or of measuring. In other words, 
it is a set of actions modifying the object, 
and enabling the knower to get at  the struc- 
tures of the transfor~nation. 
An operation is an interiorized action. 
But, in addition, it is a reversible action; 
that is, it can tala place in both directions, 
for instance, adding or subtracting, joining 
or separating. So it is a particular type 
of action which inakes up logical structures. 
Above all, an operation is never isolated. 
I t  is always linked t,o other operations, and 
as a result it is always a part of a total 
structure. For instance, a logical class does 
not exist in isolation; what exists is the 
total structure of classification. An asym- 
metrical relation does not exist in isolation. 
Seriation is the nahral, basic operational 
structure. A number does not exist 
isolation. What exists is the series of 
nun~bers which constitute a structure, an 
exceedingly rich structure whose various 
properties have been 3evealed by mathe- 
maticians. 
These operational structures are what 
seem to me to constitiute the basis of knowl- 
edge, the na;tural psychological reality, 
in terms of which we must understand the 
development of knowledge. And the cen- 
tral problem of developnlent is to under- 
stand the formation, elaboration, organiza- 
tion, and functioning of these structures. 
I should like to review the stages of 
development of these structures, not in any 
detail, but simply as a reminder. I shall 
distinguish four main stages. The first 
is a sensory-motor, pre-verbal stage, lasting 
approximately the first 18 months of life. 
During this stage is developed the practical 
knowledge which constitutes the substruc- 
ture of later representational knowledge. 
An example is the construction of the schema 
of the permanent objecb For an infant, 
during the first months, an object has no 
permanence. When it disappears from the 
perceptual field it no longer exists. No 
attempt is made to  find it again. Later, 
the infant will try to find it., and he will 
h d  it by localizing it spatially. Conse- 
quently, along with the collst~uction of the 
permanent object there comes the co~lstruc- 
tion of practical or sensory-motor space. 
There is similarly the construclion of tern- 
poral succession, and of elementary sensory- 
motor causality. In other words, there 
is a series of structures which are indis- 
pensable for the structures of later represen- 
tational thought. 
In  a second stage, we have pre-operational 
representation-the beginnings of language, 
of the symbolic function, and therefore of 
thought, or representation. But at the 
level of representational thought, there must 
now be a reconstruction of all that was 
developed on the sensory-motor level. That 
is, the s&ry-motor actions are not im- 
mediately translated into operations. In  
fact, during all this second period of pre- 
operatioil representations, there are as 
yet no operations as I defined this term a 
moment ago. Specifically, there is as yet 
no conservation which is the psychological 
criterion of the presence of reversible opera- 
tions. For example, if we pour liquid fro111 
one glass to &other of a different shape, 
the pre-operational, child will . think there 
is more in one than in the other. In the 
absence of , operational reversibility, there 
is no conservation of quantity. . 
In a third stage the first operations appear, 
but I call these concrete operations because 
they operate on objects, and not yet 
on verbally expressed hypotheses. l7or 
example, there are the operations of classi- 
fication, ordering, the construction of t,he 
idea of number, spatial arid temporal opera- 
'tions, and all the fundamental operations 
of elementary logic of classes and relations, 
of elementary mathematics, of elementary 
geometry, and even of elementary physics. 
Finally, in the fourth stage, these opera- 
tions are surpassed as the child reaches the 
level of what I call formal or hyp~thet~ic- 
deductive operations; that is, he can nol17 
reason on hypotheses, and not only on 
objects. He constructs new operations, 
operations of propositional logic, and not 
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simply the operations of classes, relations, 
and numbers. He attains new structures 
which are on the one hand combinatorial, 
corresponding to what mathematicians call 
lattices; on the other hand, more com- 
plicated group structures. At the level 
of concrete operations, the operations apply 
within an immediate neighboi-hood: for 
instance, classification by successive in- 
clusions. At the level of the combinatorial, 
however, the groups are much more mobile. 
These, then, are the four stages which we 
identify, whose formation we shall now 
attempt to explain. 
What factors can be called upon to explain 
the development from one set of structures 
to another? It seems to me that there 
are four main factors: first of all, maturation, 
in the sense of Gesell, since this development 
is a continuation of the enzbryogenesis; 
second, the role of expel-ience of the effects 
of the physical environment on the struc- 
tures of intelligence; third, social trans- 
~nission in the broad sense (linguistic trans- 
mission, education, etc.); and fourth, a 
factor which is too often neglected but one 
which seenzs to me fundamental and even 
the principal factor. I shall call this the 
factor of equilibration or if you prefer it, 
of self-regulation. 
Let us start with the first factor, matura- 
tion. One might thinlc that these stages 
are simply a reflection of an interior matura- 
tion of the nervous system, following the 
hypotheses of Gesell, for example. Well, 
maturation certainly does play an indis- 
pensable role and must not be ignored. It 
certainly talies part in every transformation 
that talies place during a child's develop- 
ment. However, this first factor is insuffi- 
cient in itself. First of all, we know practi- 
cally nothing about the maturation of the 
nervous systenz beyond the first months 
of the child's existence. We know a little 
bit about i t  during the first two years but 
wc know very little following this tinze. But 
above all, maturation doesn't explain every- 
thing, because the average ages a t  which 
these stages appear (the average chronologi- 
cal ages) vary a great deal from one society to 
another. The ordering of these st,agcs is 
constant and has been found in all t.he so&- 
ties studi.ed. It has been found in various 
countries where psychologists in u11ivc.r- 
sities have redone the experiments hut it 
has also been found in African peoples for 
example, in the children of the Bush~lial, 
and in Iran, both in the villages and in the 
cities. However, although the order. of 
succession is constant, the chronological 
ages of these stages varies a great deal. ]?or 
instance, the ages which we have found in 
Geneva are not necessarily the ages which 
you would find in the United States. In 
Iran, furthermore, in the city of Teharan, 
they found approxi~nately the same ages 
as we found in Geneva, but there is a syste- 
inatic delay of two years in the childre11 in 
the country. Canadian psychologists ~ ~ 1 1 0  
redid our experiments, Monique Laurendeau 
and Father Adrien Pinard, found once again 
about the same ages in Montreal. Hut 
when they redid the experiments in Marti- 
nique, they found a delay of four years in all 
the experiments and this in spite of the fact. 
that the children in Martinique go to a 
school set up according to the .French system 
and the French curriculum and attain a t  
the end of this elementary school a ner.t.ificat;u 
of higher primary education. There is 
then a delay of four years, that is, tfherc arc? 
the same stages, but systelnatically delayed. 
So you see that these age variations SIIOTV 
that maturation does not explain everytlling. 
I shall go on now to the role played by 
experience. Experience of objects, of phys- 
ical reality, is obviously a basic factor in 
the development of cognitive structur.os. 
But once again this factor does not explain 
everything. I can give two rcaso~ls for 
this. The first reason is that so~ile of the 
concepts which appear a t  the beginning of 
the stage of concrete operations are suoh 
that I cannot see how they could be drawri 
from experience. As an example, let us 
take the conservation of the suhstali(;e in 
the case of changing the shape of a ball of 
plasticene. We give this ball of plastioene 
to a child who changes it.s shape int80 a 
sausage form and we ask him if thcrc is Ihe 
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same amount of matter, that is, the same 
'amount of substance as there was before. 
We also ask hp~ if it now has the same 
weight and thirdly if it now has the same 
volume. The volun~e is measured by the 
displacement of water when we put the 
ball or the sausage into a glass of water. 
The findings, which have been the same 
every time this experiment has been done, 
show us that first of all there is conservation 
of the amount of substance.. At about 
eight years old a child will say, "There is 
the same.amount of plasticene." Only later 
does the child assert that the weight 
is conserved and still later that the volume 
is conserved. .So I would ask you where 
the idea of the conservation of substance 
can come from. What is a constant and 
invariant substance when it doesn't yet 
have a constant weight or a constant 
volume?. Through p ception you can get 
a t  the weight of the t all or the volume of 
the ball but perception cannot give you an 
idea of the iplount of substance. No 
experiment, no experience can show the 
child. that there is the same amount of 
substance. He can weigh the ball and 
that would lead to the conservation of 
weight. He can immerse it in water and that 
would lead to the conservation of volume. 
But the notion of substance is attained 
before either weight or volume. This 
conservation of substance is simply a 
logical necessity. The child now under- 
stands that when there is a transformation 
something must be conserved because by 
reversing the transformation you can come 
back to the point of departure and once 
again have the ball. He knows that some- 
thing is conserved but he doesn't know what. 
It is not yet the weight, it is not yet the 
volume; it is simply a logical f o r m a  
logical necessity. There, it seems to me, 
is an exaniple of a ,progress in knowledge, 
a logical necessity for something to be 
conserved even though no experience can 
have lead to this notion: 
My second objection to the sufficiency of 
experience as an explanatory factor is that 
this notion of experience is a very' equivocal 
one. There are, in fact, two kinds of 
experience which are psychologically veiy 
different and this differeilce is very in~portant~ 
from the pedagogical point of view. It is 
because of the pedagogical importa~ice that 
I emphasize this distinction. First of all, 
there is what I shall call physical experieuce, 
and, secondly, what I shall call logical- 
mathematical experience. 
Physical experience consists of acting 
upon objects and drawing some knowledge 
about the objects by abstraction from the 
objects. For example, to discover that 
this pipe is heavier than this watch, the 
chid will weigh them both and find the 
difference in the objects themselves. This 
is experience in the usual sense of the term- 
in the sense used by empiricists. But there 
is a second type of experience which I 
shall call logical mathematical experience 
where the knowledge is not drawn from the 
objects, but it is drawn by the actions 
effected upon the objects. This is not 
the same thing. When one acts upon 
objects, the objects are indeed there, but 
there is also the set of actions which modify 
the objects. 
I shall give you an example of this type 
of experience. I t  is a nice example because 
we .have verified it many times in small 
children under seven years of age, but it 
is also an example which one of my mathe- 
matician friends has related to me about 
his own childhood, and he dates his mathe- 
matical career from this experience. When 
he was four or five years old-I don't know 
exactly how old, but a small child-he 
was seated on the ground in his garden and 
he was counting pebbles. Now to count 
these pebbles he put them in a row and he 
counted them one, two, three, up to ten. 
Then he finished counting them and started 
to count them in the other direction. He 
began by the end and once again he found 
ten. He found this marvelous that there 
were ten in one direction and ten in the 
other direction. So he put them in a 
circle and counted them that way and found 
ten once again. Then he counted thein in 
the other direction and found ten once 
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more, So he put them in some other 
arrangement and kept counting them and 
kept iinding ten. There was the discovery 
that he made. 
Now what indeed did he discover? He 
did not discover a property of pebbles; 
he discovered a property of the action of 
ordering. The pebbles had no order. It 
was his action which introduced a linear 
order or a cyclical order, or any kind of an 
order. He discovered that the sum was 
independent of the order. The order was 
the action which he introduced among the 
pebbles. For the sum the same principle 
applied. The pebbles had no sum; they 
were simply in a pile., To make a sum, 
action was necessary-the operation of 
putting together and counting. , He found 
that the sum was independent of the order, 
in other words, that the action of putting 
together is independent 'of the action of 
ordering. He discovered a property of 
actions and not a property of pebbles. You 
may say that it is in the nature of pebbles 
to let this be done to them and this is true. 
But it could have been drops of water, and 
drops of water would not have let this be 
done to them because two drops of water 
and two drops of water do not make four 
drops of water as you know very well. 
Drops of water then would not let this be 
done to them, we agree to that. 
So it is not the physical property of peb- 
bles which- the experience uncovered. It is 
the properties of the actions carried out on 
the pebbles, and this is quite another form 
of experience. It is the point of departure 
of mathematical deduction. The subse- 
quent deduction will consist. of interiorizing 
these actions and then of combining them 
without needing any pebbles. The rnathe- ' 
matician no longer needs his pebbles. He 
can combine his operations simply with 
syinbols, and the point of departure of this 
mathematical deduction is logical-mathe- 
matical experience, and this is not a t  all 
experience in the sense of the empiricists. 
It is the beginning of the coordination of 
actions, but this coordination of actions 
before the stage of operations needs t.o be 
supported by concrete material. Later, this 
coordination of actions leads to tho logical- 
mathematical structures. I believe that 
logic is not a derivative of language. The 
source of logic is much more profound. It 
is the total coordination of actions, actions 
of joining things together, or orderitlg 
things, etc. This is what logical-mathe- 
matical experience is. It is an expe1-iolu:e 
of the actions of the subject, and 1101 an 
experience of objects themselves. It is an 
experience which is necessary before there 
can be operations. Once the operations 
have been attained this experience in no 
longer needed and the coordinations of 
actions can take place by themselves in tho 
form of deduction and construction for 
abstract structures. 
The third factor is social transmission- 
linguistic transmission or educational trans- 
mission. This factor, once again, is funda- 
mental. I do not deny the role of ally 
one of these factors; they all play a part. 
But this factor is insufEcient because t,he 
child can receive valuable inforniation via 
language or via education directed by an 
adult only if he is in a state where he can 
understand this information. That is, to 
receive the information he nlust have a 
structure which enables him to assimilate 
this information. This is why you cannot 
teach higher mathenlatics to a five-year-old. 
He does not yet have structures whic.11 
enable him to understand. 
I shall take a much sinlpler example, 
an example of linguistic transmission. As 
my very &st work in the realm of child 
psychology, I spent a long time studying 
the relation between a part and a whole ill 
concrete experience and in language. For 
example, I used Burt's test employing Ihe 
sentence, "Some of my flowers are  butt(^- 
cups." The child knows that all butter- 
cups are yellow, so there are three possible 
conclusions : the whole bouquet is yellow, 
or part of the bouquet is yellow, or noilc of 
the flowers in the bouquet are yellow. 1 
found that up until nine years of age (and 
this was in Paris, so the children certaillly 
did understand the French language) they 
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replied, "The whole bouquet is yellow or 
some of my flowers are yellow." Both of 
those mean the same thing. They did not 
understand the expression, "some of my 
flowers." They did not understand this 
of as a partitive genitive, as the inclusion of 
some flowers in my flowers. They under- 
stood some of my flowers to be my several 
flowers as if the several flowers and the 
flowers were confused as one and the same 
class. So there you have children who 
until nine years of age heard every day a 
linguistic structure which implied the in- 
clusion of a subclass in a class and yet did 
not understand this structure. I t  is only 
when they themselves are in 5.rm possession 
of this logical structure, when they have 
constructed it for themselves according to 
the developmental lqws which we shall 
discuss, that they succebd in understanding 
correctly the linguistic expression. 
I come now to the fourth factor which is 
added to the three preceding ones but which 
seems to me to be the fundamental one. 
This is what I call the factor of equilibration. 
Since there are already three factors, they 
must somehow be equilibrated among them- 
selves. That is one reason for bringing iil 
the factor of equilibration. There is a 
second reason, however, which seems to me 
to be fundamental. I t  is that in the act 
of knowing, the subject is active, and conse- 
quently, faced with an external disturbance, 
he will react in order to compensate and 
consequentl~,r he will tend towards equilib- 
rium. Equilibrium, defined by active com- 
pensation, leads to reversibility. Opera- 
tional reversibility is a model of an equili- 
brated system where a transformation in 
one direction is compensated by a trans- 
formation in the other direction. Equili- 
bration, as I understand it, is thus an active 
process. It is a process of self-regulation. 
I think that this self-regulation is a funda- 
lliental factor in development. I use this 
term in the sense in which it is used in 
cybernetics, that is, in the sense of processes 
with feedback and with feedforward, of 
processes which regulate themselves by a 
progressive compensation of systenls. This 
process of equilibration takes the fonn of a 
succession of levels of equilibriuln, of levels 
which have a certain probability which I 
shall call a sequential probability, that is, 
the probabilities are not established a pio7.i. 
There is a sequence of levels. It is not 
possible to reach the second level unless 
equilibrium has been reached at  the Grst 
level, and the equilibrium of the third level 
only becomes possible when the equilib- 
rium of the second level has been reached, 
and so forth. That is, each level is deter- 
mined as the most probable given that the 
preceding level has been reached. It is 
not the most probable at  the beginning, 
but it is the most probable once the preced- 
ing level has been reached. 
As an exaniple, let us take the develop- 
ment of the idea of conservation in the 
transformation of the ball of plasticene into 
the sausage shape. Here you can discern 
four levels. The most probable a t  the 
beginning is for the child to think of only 
one dimension. Suppose that there is a 
probability of 0.8, for instance, that the 
child will focus on the length, and that 
the width has a probability of 0.2. This 
would mean that of ten children, eight 
will focus on the length alone without 
paying any attention to the width, and two 
will focus on the width without paying any 
attention to the length. They will focus 
only on one dimension or the other. Since 
the two dimensions are independent a t  this 
stage, focusing on both a t  once would have 
a probability of only 0.16. That is less than 
either one of the two. In other words, 
the most probable in the beginning is to 
focus only on one dimension and in fact the 
child will say, "It's longer, so there's more 
in the sausage." Once he has reached this 
first level, if you continue to elongate the 
sausage, there comes a moment when he 
will say, "No, now it's too thin, so there's 
less." Now he is thinking about the width, 
but he forgets the length, so you have conle 
to a second level which becomes the most 
probable after the first level, but which is 
not the most probable at  the point, of 
departure. Once he has focused on the 
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width, he will come back sooner or later 
to focus on the length. Here you will have 
a third level where he will oscillate between 
width and length and where he will 
discover that the two are related. When 
you elongate you make it thinner, and 
when you make it shorter, you make i t  
thicker. He discovers that the two are 
solidly related and in discovering this rela- 
tionship, he will start to think in terms of 
transformation and not only. in terms of 
the h a 1  coniiguration. Now he will say 
that when it gets longer it gets thinner, so 
it's the same thing. There is more of it 
in length but less of it in width. When 
you make it shorter it gets thicker; there's 
less in length and more in width, so there 
is compensation-compensation which de- 
fines equilibrium in the sense in which I 
defined it a moment ago. Consequently, 
you have operations and conservation. In 
other words, in the course of these develop- 
ments you will always h d  a process of 
self-regulation which I call equilibration and 
which seems to me the fundamental f&CtOl 
in the acquisition of logical-mathematical 
knowledge. 
I shall go on now to the second part of 
my lecture, that is, to deal with the topic 
of learning. Classically, learning is based 
on the stinldueresponse schema. I think 
the stimulus-response schema, . while I 
won't say it is false, is in any case entirely 
incapable of explaining cognitive learning. 
Why? Because when you think of a 
stimulus-response schema, you think usu- 
ally that first of all there is a stimulus and 
then a response is set off by this stimulus. 
For my part, I am convinced that the 
response was there first, if I can express 
myself in this way. A stimulus is a stimulus 
- only to the extent that it is significant, 
and it becomes significant only to the 
extent that there is a structure which 
permits its assimilation, a structure which 
can integrate this stimulus but which at  
the same time sets off the response. In 
other words, I would propose that the 
stimulus-response schema be written in 
the circular form-in the form of a schema 
or of a structure which is not siniply one 
way. I would propose that above aU, 
between the stimulus and the respo~lse, 
there is the organism, the organism and 
its structures. The stimulus is really a 
stimulus only when it is assimilated into a 
structure and it is this s t r u c t ~ e  which 
s.ets off the response. Consequently, it 
is not an exaggeration to say that, the 
response is there first, or if you wish at  the 
beginning there is the structure. Of course 
we would want to understand how this struc- 
ture comes to be. I tried to do this earlier 
by a model of equilibration or 
self-regulation. Once there is a structure, 
the stimulus will set off a response, but orlly 
by the intermediary of this structure. 
I should like to present *me facts. We 
have facts in great number. -. I shall choose 
only one or two and I shall choose sorrie 
facts which our colleague, Smedslund, has 
gathered. (Smedslund is currently a t  the 
Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies.) 
Smedslund arrived in Geneva a few years 
ago convinced (he had published this in 
one of his papers) that the developnlent of 
the ideas of conservation could be in-. 
dehitely accelerated through learning of 
a stimulwresponse type. I invited S~neds- 
lund to come to spend a year in Geneva 
to show us this, to show as  that he could 
accelerate the development of operational 
conservation. I shall relate only one of his 
experiments. 
During the year that he spent in Get~cva 
he chose to work on the conse~atio~l of
weight. The conservation of weight is, 
in fact, easy to study since there is a pos- 
sible external reinforcement, that is, si~nply 
weighing the ball and the sausage 011 a 
balance. Then you can study the child's 
reactions to these external results. Smeds- 
lund studied the conservation of weight 
on the one hand, and on the other hand he 
studied the transitivity of weights, that is, 
the transitivity of equalities if A = B and 
B = C, then A = C, or the transitivit,jr of 
the inequalities if A is 1ws than B, and B is 
less than C, then A is less than C. 
As far as conservation is conoen~ed, 
DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING 153 
Smedshmd succeeded very easily with five- 
and six-year-old children in getting them 
to generalize that weight is conserved when 
the ball is transformed into a different shape. 
The child' sees the ball transformed into 
a sausage or into little pieces or into a 
or into' any other 'form, he weighs 
it, and he sees that it is always the same 
thing. He will affirm it will be the same 
thing, no matter what you do to it; it 
will come out to be the same weight. Thus 
Smedslund very easily achieved the conserva- 
tion of weight by this sort of external 
reinforcement. 
In contrast to this, however, the same 
rliethod did not succeed in teaching transi- 
tivity. The children resisted the notion of 
transitivity. A child would , redict cor- 
rectly in certain cases but he $, uld inalce 
his predictioil as a possibility or a probability 
and not as a certainty. There was never 
this generalized certainty in the case of 
transitivity. 
So there is the first example, which seems 
to nze very instructive, because in this prob- 
lem in the conservation of weight there are 
two aspects. There is the physical aspect 
and there is the logical-mathematical as- 
pect. Note that Smedslund started his 
study by establishing that there was a 
correlation between conseivation and tran- 
sitivity. He began by making a statistical 
study on the relationships between the 
spontaneous responses to the questions about 
conservation and the spontaneous responses 
to the questions about transitivity, and he 
found a very significant correlation. But 
in the learning experiment, he obtained 
a learning of conservation and not of transi- 
tivity. Consequently, Ire successfully ob- 
tained a learning of what I called earlier 
physical experience (which is not surprising 
since it is simply a question of noting facts 
about objects), but he did not successfully 
obtain a learning in the construction of the 
logical structure. This 'doesn't surprise 
me either, since the logical structure is not 
the result of physical experience. I t  cannot 
be obtained by external reinforcement. 
The logical structure is reached only through 
internal equilibration, by self-regulatiot 1, 
and the external reinforcement of seeing that. 
the balance did not suffice to establish this 
logical structure of transitivity. 
I could give many other comparable ex- 
amples, but it seems useless to me to insist 
upon these negative examples. Now I 
should like to show that learning is possible 
in the case of these logical-mathematical 
structures, but on one condition-that is, 
that the structure which you want to teach 
to the subjects can be supported by simpler, 
more elementary, logical-mathematical 
structures. I shall give you an example. 
I t  is the example of the conservation of 
number in the cask of one-to-one correspond- 
ence. If .you give a child seven blue tokens 
and ask him to put down as many red tokens, 
there is a preoperational stage where he will 
put one red one opposite each blue one. But 
when you spred out the red ones, nmking 
them into a longer row, he will say to you, 
'!Now, there are more red ones than there 
are blue ones." 
Now how can we accelerate, if you want 
to accelerate, the acquisition of this con- 
servation of number? well, you can imagine 
an analogous structure but in a simpler, 
more elementary situation. For example, 
with Mlle. Inhelder, we have been studying 
recently the notion of one-to-one come 
spondence by giving the child two glasses 
of the same shape and a big pile of beads. 
The child puts a bead into one glass with 
one hand and at. the same time a bead into 
the other glass with the other hand. Tinie 
after time he repeats this action, a bead into 
one glass with one hand and a t  the same t in~e 
a bead into the other glass with the other 
hand and he sees that the? is always the 
same amount on each side. Then you hide 
one of the glasses. You cover it up. He no 
longer sees this glass but he continues to 
put one bead into it while a t  the same time 
putting one bead into the other glass which 
he can e. Then you ask him whether the 
equality has been con&rved, whether there 
is still the same amount in one glass as in 
the other. Now you will find that very s n d  
children, about four years old, don't want 
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to inake a prediction. They will say, "So 
far, it has been the same amount, but now 
I don't know. I can't see any more, so I 
don't know." They do not want to gener- 
alize. But the generalization is made from 
the age of about five and one-half years. 
This is in contrast to the case of the red 
and blue tokens with one row spread out, 
where it isn't until seven or eight years of 
age that children will say there are the same 
nunlber in the two rows. As one example 
of this generalization, I recall a little boy 
of five years and nine months who had been 
adding the beads to the glasses for a little 
while. Then we asked him whether, if he 
continued to do this all day and all night 
and all the next day, there would always 
be the same amount in the two glasses. 
The little boy gave this admirable reply. 
"Once you know, you know for always." 
In other words, this was recursive reasoning. 
So here the child does acquire the structure 
in this specific case. The number is a 
synthesis of class inclusion and ordering. 
This synthesis is being favored by the child's 
own actions. You have set up a situation 
where there is an iteration of one same nc- 
tion which continues and which is therefore 
ordered while a t  the same time being in- 
clusive. You have, so to speak, a localized 
synthesis of inclusion and ordering which 
facilitates the construction of the idea 
of nunlber in this specific case, and there you 
can find, in effect, an influence of this 
experience on the other experience. How- 
ever, this influence is not imniediate. 
We study the generalization from this re- 
cursive situation to the other situation 
where the tokens are laid on the table in 
rows, and it is not an immediate generaliza- 
tion but it is made possible through inter- 
mediaries. In other words, you can find 
some learning of this structure if you base 
the learning on simpler structures. 
In this same area of the developn~ent of 
riumerical structures, the psychologist Joa- 
chiiri Wohlwill, who spent a year at  our 
Institute at  Geneva, has also shown that 
this acquisition can be accelerated through 
introducing additive operations, which is 
what we introduced also in the expel-inlent 
which I just described. Wahlwill intro- 
duced them in a different way but he too was 
able to obtain a certain learning effect. 
I n  other words, learning is possible if 
you base the more complex structure 011 
simpler structures, that is, when there is a 
natural relationship and development, of 
structures and not simply an exteinal ya- 
inforcement. 
Now I would like to take a few minutes to 
conclude what I was saying. My first 
conclusion is that learning of strutrt,ures 
seems to obey the same laws a s  the nalural 
development of these structures. In  ot,her 
words, learning is subordinated to develop- 
ment and not vice-versa as I said in the 
introduction. No doubt you will object 
that some investigators have succeeded 
in teaching operational structures. But, 
when I am faced with these facts, , I  always 
have three questions which I want to have 
answered before I am convinced. 
The first question is: "Is this learning 
lasting? What remains two weeks or a 
month later?" If a structure develops 
spontaneously, once it has reached a state of 
equilibrium, it is lasting, it will, continue 
throughout the child's entire life. Whcli 
you achieve the learning by external rein- 
forcement, is the result lasting or not 
and what are the conditions necessary for jt 
to be lasting? 
The second question is: "How much 
generalization is possible?" What makes 
learning interesting is the possibility of 
transfer of a generalization. When you have 
brought about some learning, you can always 
ask whether this is an isolated piece in t'hc 
midst of the child's mental life, or if it is really 
a dynamic structure which can lead t'o 
generalizations. 
Then there is the third question: "In the 
case of each learning experience what was 
the 0pera;tional level of'the subject before 
the experience and what more co~liplex 
structures, has this l~arning succeeded in 
achieving?" In  other words, we must looli 
a t  each specific learning experience from the 
point of view of the spontaneous operatio~~s 
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which were present at  the outset and the 
operational level which has been achieved 
after the learning experience. 
My second conclusion is that the funda- 
mental relation involved in all develop- 
ment and ' all learning is not the relation 
of association. In the stimulus-response 
schema, the relation between the response 
and the stimulus is understood to be one of 
association. In contrast to this, I think. 
that the fundamental relation is one of 
assimilation. ~ssimilation is not the same 
as association. I shall define assimilation 
as the integration of any sort of reality into a 
structure, and it is this assimilation which 
seems to me to be fundamental in learning, 
and which seems to me to be the fundamental 
relation from the point of vie of peda- 
gogical 6r didactic applications. \ll of my 
remarks today represent the child and the 
learning subject as active. An operation 
is an activity. Learning is possible only 
when there is active assimilation. ' It is 
this activity on the part of the subject 
which seems to me to be underplayed in the 
stimulus-response schema. The presenta- 
tion which I propose puts the emphasis on 
the idea of self-regulation, on assimilation. 
All the emphasis is placed on the activity 
of the subject himself, and I think that with- 
out this activity there is no possible didactic 
or pedagogy which significantly trans- 
forms the subject. 
Finally, and this will be my last concluding 
reniarlr, I would like to coniment on an 
excellent publication by the psychologist 
Berlyne. Berlyne spent a year with us in 
Geneva during which he intended to trans- 
late our results on the development of opera- 
tions into stimulus-response language, spe- 
cifically into Hull's learning theory. Berlyne 
published in our series of studies of genetic 
epistemology a very good article on this 
conlparison between the results obtained in 
Geneva and Hull's theo:y. In the same 
volume, I published a commentary on 
' Berlyne's results. The essence of Berlyne's 
results is this: Our findings can very well be 
translated into Hullian language, but only 
on condition that two modifications are 
introduced. Berlyne himself f o u ~ ~ d  these 
modifications .quite considerable, hut* they 
seemed to him to concern more the con- 
ceptualization than the Hullian theory it- 
self. I am not. so sure about that. The 
two modifications are these. First of all, 
Berlyne wants to distinguish two sorts of 
response in the S-R schema: (a) responses 
in the ordinary, classical sense, which I 
shall call "copy responses;" (b) responses 
which Berlyne calls "transformation re- 
sponses." Transformation responses con- 
sist of transforming one response of the 
first type into another response of the first 
type. These transformation responses are 
what I call operations, and you can see 
right away that this f a rather serious 
modification of Hull's conceptualization 
because here you are introducing an ele- ' 
ment of transformation alhd thus of assimila- 
tion and no longer the simple association of 
stin~ulus-response theory. 
The second modification which Berlyne 
introduces into the stimulus-response lan- 
guage is the introduction of what he calls 
internal reinforcements. What are these 
internal reinforcements? They are what I 
c d  equilibration or self-regulation. The 
internal reinforcements are what enable the 
subject to eliminate contradictions, in- 
compatibilities, and conflicts. AU develop- 
ment is composed of momentary cohflicts 
and incompatibilities which must be over- 
come to reach a higher level of equilibrium. 
Berlyne calls this elimination of incompati- - 
bilities internal reinforcements. 
So you see that it is indeed a s t i m u l u ~  
response theory, if you will, but first you 
add operations and then you add equilibra- 
tion. That's all we want! 
Editor's nok: A brief question and answer period 
followed Professor Piaget's presenIcrtion. Tlre jirsi 
question rel&d to the fact that the eight-year-old chdd 
acquires wnservation of weQM and volume. T h  
question asked if this didn't wntradiet the order of 
emrgenee of the pre-operaiional and operational stages. 
Piagei's response f o l h s :  
The conservation of weight and the con- 
servation of volume are not due only to 
experience. There is also involved a logical 
framework which is characterized by reversi- 
bility and the system of compensations. 
I an1 only saying that in the case of weight 
and volume, weight corresponds to a per- 
ception. There is an empirical contact. 
The same is true of volume. But in the 
case of substance, I don't see how there can 
be ariy perceptio~l of substance independent 
of weight or volume. The strange thing 
is that this riotion of substance comes before 
the two other notions. Note that in the 
history of thought we have the same thing. 
The first Greelr: physicists, the pre-socratic 
philosophers, discovered conservation of 
substance independently of any experience. 
I do not believe this is contradictory to 
the theory of operations. This conserva- 
tion of substance is siiziply the affiriziation 
that something must be conserved. The 
children do not know specifically what is 
conserved. They know that since the sau- 
sage can beco~ne a ball again there must be 
something which is conserved, and saying 
"substance" is simply a way of translating 
this logical necessity for conservation. But 
this logical necessity results directly froin 
the discovery of operations. I do not tlziiili 
that this is contradictory with the theory of 
development. 
Edilor's note: ?'he second question zas whether or not 
/he development of stages in children's thinking could 
be accekrated hy practice, training, ancl exercise in 
perception and memory. Piaget's response follows: 
I am not very sure that exercise of per- 
ception and memory would be sufficient. 
I think that we ilzust distinguish within t,hc 
cognitive function two very different aspects 
which I shall call the figurative aspect and 
the operative aspect. The figurative aspc:c.t 
deals with static configurations. In physi- 
cal reality there are states, and in addition 
to these there are tra~lsformations wl~icll 
lead from one state to another. In cogni- 
tive functioning one has the figurative as- 
pects-for example, perception, imitation, 
mental imagery, etc. 
The operative aspect includes operatiol~s 
and the actioris which lead from one state 
to another. I11 children of the higher stagca 
and in adults, the figurative aspects arc 
subordinated to the operative aspects. Any 
given state is understood to be the result of 
some transformation and the point of de- 
parture for another transformation. But 
the pre-operational child does not understand 
transformations. He does not have tJll(1 
operations necessary to understand the111 
so he puts all the emphasis on the stalk 
quality of the states. I t  is because of this, 
for example, that in the conservation experi- 
ments he simply compares the initial state 
and the final state without being concer11c.d 
with the transformation. 
In exercising perception and n~emory, I 
feel that you will reinforce the figurative 
aspect without touchirig the operative as- 
pect. Consequently, I'm not sure that this 
mill accelerate the developizlent of cognitive. 
structures. What needs to be reinforocd 
is the operative aspect-not the analysis of 
states, but the uriderstarlding of transforma- 
tions. 
Physics Problems and 
the Process of Self .Regulation 
Anton E. Lawson and Warren T. Wollman 
In two previous articles1q2 Jean Piaget's theory of intellectual 
development and its general implications for physics teaching were 
discussed. The purpose of this article is to examine more closely one 
aspect of that theory and discuss its implications for designing and 
using homework problems. We will briefly describe the process of 
self-regulation (the process Piaget hypothesizes governs all intellectual 
growth) and suggest a way in which homework problems can be used to 
provide students an opportunity for self-regulation. Further, we will 
discuss deficiencies of typical homework problems and provide a 
number of example problems which we believe can initiate 
self-regulation. Through the process of self-regulation initiated by 
thought-provoking problems, we believe students will not only be able 
to develop understandings of the concepts involved but will also 
progress from relatively concrete (or limited) to more abstract (or 
generalizable) modes of thinking. 
The process of self-regulation 
The process by which Piaget hypothesizes that patterns of 
reasoning are refined, extended, or combined with other patterns of 
reasoning is called self-regulation, Initially, basic reasoning patterns 
serve to guide an individual's actions within his surroundings. As long as 
those actions promote satisfactory interaction, the basic patterns 
continue to guide behavior. However, owing to the individual's 
extended interaction with his environment he meets contradictions. 
that is, situations for which his initial patterns of reasoning do not  
serve as effective guides to behavior. These contradictions produce a 
state of disequilibrium. In other words, his patterns of reasoning are 
found wanting and must somehow be changed. If the disequilibrium is 
not too great, he will spontaneously begin to alter his patterns of 
reasoning in an attempt to assimilate the new situation. The process by 
which an individual actively seeks to reestablish equilibrium is termed 
self-regulation. The altered reasoning patterns which develop are then 
tried. If the patterns guide behavior successfully so that the person's 
efforts obtain positive feedback the patterns are reinforced. Continued 
positive feedback then produces an increasingly stable set of reasoning 
patterns. In this manner the person gradually builds new reasoning 
patterns and adapts to new situations. 
Homework problems can initiate self-regulation 
The gradual process of reestablishing equilibrium through 
self-regulation affords the possibility of initiating interactions between 
students and subject matter with the use of homework problems 
provided the following two factors are present: Problems must be 
chosen so that the student can partially but not completely understand 
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Typical homework problems seldom require a student 
to examine his own thinking. 
them in terms of old ideas (i.e., a moderate state of 
disequilibrium must result from the problem); and 
sufficient time must be allowed for the student to grapple 
with the new situation, possibly with appropriate "hints" 
to direct his thinking, but allowing him to put the ideas 
together himself. 
An important facet then in selecting problems which 
encourage self-regulation is to obtain a careful match 
between what the student knows and the kind of problem 
he is asked to work through. The ideal situation would 
seem to be one in which the problems are challenging but 
are felt t o  be solvable. The hypothesis is that a challenging 
but solvable problem will place a student into an initial 
state of disequilibrium. However, through his own efforts at 
bringing together what he has done in the laboratory, read 
in the textbook, heard in lectures, learned from other past 
experiences, and obtained from teacher or peer discussions 
he will gradually organize his thinking about this 
information and successfully solve the problem. This 
success will then establish a new and more stable 
equilibrium. The new state of equilibrium will be one with 
increased understanding of the subject matter and increased 
problem-solving capability. Before giving examples of the 
kind of problem we believe can initiate self-regulation a few 
comments will be made regarding deficiencies of standard 
homework problems. 
What's wrong with typical homework problems? 
Typical homework problems seldom require a student 
to examine his own thinking, make comparisons, and raise 
questions which, in fact, are crucial to scientific inquiry. 
These problems usually require students to apply an 
equation or sometimes two or three equations to obtain a 
solution. Students quickly come to realize that the name of 
this game is "Can you discover the correct equation?" This 
is a game of recognition-a sort of high order matching 
process involving little thought. Although this process can 
be an important one, we believe that little if any 
self-regulation takes place in this way. Typical homework 
problems do not require the student to think about: 
1. The data o f  theproblem. Usually there is just the right 
amount, no more nor less, whereas in real situations 
there is either a dearth or superfluity of information 
and the problem is to discover what is relevant. 
2. The approach to the problem. Usually this is 
determined by the chapter heading. If, for example, a 
mechanics problem can be solved either by Lagrange's 
equations, Newton's laws, or energy conservation, the 
choice is dictated by irrelevant considerations, e.g., the 
problem comes from the chapter on Lagrange's 
equations. I t  is important for students to learn that 
many approaches may seem reasonable and the 
problem is to decide whether one is particularly 
appropriate. 
3. The tacit assumptions o f  a problem-solving strategy, 
for example deciding between use of Boyle's law or 
the Van der Wads equation. This decision is usually 
made for the student, not by the student. 
4. The physical arguments involved in the problem as 
opposed to the mathematical ones. Too often 
problems are only exercises in using mathematical 
tools (a necessary exercise) without ever demanding 
that the student try either to arrive at or qualitatively 
justify the mathematical result by physical 
(phenomenological) arguments utilizing both 
principles and order of magnitude calculations. 
Indeed, the physical or intuitive argument often 
precedes the mathematical in real research. 
5. The statement of a problem. Problems are tailored to 
fit the text when, in fact, the real problem is doing the 
tailoring by conceptualizing a real situation in terms of 
a model. This involves all of the above points. 
How to encourage self-regulation 
A few points should be kept in mind when designing, 
discussing, using, and scoring problems to encourage 
self-regulation: 
1. Open-ended problems (problems with no single 
solution) are often excellent tools to encourage 
thinking. 
2. Problems which present an apparent paradox produce 
disequilibrium and can initiate self-regulation. Paradox 
problems by their nature are generally short and 
incisive. Leighton in his foreword to the exercise 
workbook written to accompany The Feynman 
Lectures in physics3 discussed the kinds of problems 
which appeared most suitable to him. He suggested 
that problems of a kind that are numerically or 
analytically simple, yet incisive and illuminating in 
content were particularly useful. 
3. To encourage self-regulation it is often helpful t o  ask 
students to record and hand in all the various ideas 
they tried and found unsuccessful as well as the ones 
which were successful in arriving at the problem 
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"Real" problems should, and indeed must, involve a 
certain amount of trial and error. 
solution. Discussions of these steps in an atmosphere 
in which these ideas are recognized not only as 
worthwhile but as necessary, clue students into the 
fact that "real" problems should and indeed must 
involve a certain amount of trial and error, albeit 
informed trial and error. 
albeit informed trial and error. 
4. Have the students search for necessary data so they 
examine their conceptualization of the problem. 
Either give superfluous data or omit necessary data. 
To account for the latter, students should have to 
make plausible assumptions or introduce suitable 
symbols for quantities that are needed to solve the 
problem. 
5. Require students to draw a diagram of the physical 
situation. To do  this students have to think deeply 
about the spatial relationships of the interacting 
objects, and may find discrepancies as they compare 
their preconceptions with the diagram. 
6. Provide for a "problem clinic" or tutorial service 
where students can get help with problems while they 
are solving them, and before they have to be turned in. 
Interaction with other persons can be very helpful and 
is often even necessary if students are to 
conceptualize, then critically analyze their own 
thinking. 
7. For problems designed to engage a student over a 
period of, say, two weeks, the teacher should consult 
with the student several times in order to: 
A. Discuss with him his initial approach. If this 
approach is reasonable but known in advance to be 
inappropriate, the teacher should not intervene at  this 
point, but rather let the student discover for himself 
why the approach will not work. 
B. Discuss with the student alternative approaches 
both when the initial approach is appropriate and 
when it is reasonable but not appropriate. In either 
case, let ,the student first discover which approach will 
work. Then discuss alternatives, even if the first 
approach worked. I t  may be that he will accept 
inappropriate alternatives as reasonable. He may then 
discover on his own why they are not. 
C. Discuss both semi-quantitative (order of magnitude) 
and qualitative arguments anticipating the outcome of 
more rigorous approaches. Limiting cases should be 
used as a check when solutions to simpler problems 
are already known. 
D. Discuss alternatives to an inappropriate and 
time-consuming approach. This is to avoid having the 
student spend too much time discovering the 
inadequacies of an approach. Overall, the student 
should get from the teacher a feeling for the general 
considerations appropriate to choosing and comparing 
strategies, i.e., a feeling for the process of inquiry. 
8. Although solutions (numerical or algebraic) should be 
provided for all problems (not just the 
"odd-numbered" ones), students must understand that 
a premature glance at  a solution will surely affect their 
conception of the problem and distort the problem 
solving procedure. Knowledge of the solution can 
provide stimulating feedback after the student has 
completed and carried through a formulation of a 
solution. 
Examples of problems that can promote self-regulation 
Problem 1 Since the net force on the spring scale shown in Comment: This example, which is especially useful when 
Fig. 1 is zero how can the scale register a associated with a demonstration, illustrates how a little 
non-zero reading? What does the scale register? knowledge can go a wrong way. At first, concepts are 
Why isn't it  20 since it is pulled by 10 lbs at only vaguely grasped and thus over-extended. Here we 
each end? obviously have two forces whose sum is equal t o  zero 
SPRING BALANCE and yet the scale does not read zero. Or, we might think 
that each force contributes 10  lbs of tension to the scale 
to give 20 lbs. These two approaches use unrestricted 
(over-extended) concepts which must be coordinated, 
via self-regulation, with other concepts, e.g., free-body 
diagrams and action-reaction, in order to resolve the 
discrepancy. 
Fig. 1. Spring balance and suspended weights. 
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Problem 2 A capacitor and resistor are connected in a 
circuit as shown in Fig. 2. The values are 
C = 250 ppf, R = 1 0  000 a, and E = 400 V. 
Initially the switch is closed and then it is 
opened suddenly. Use two methods to 
calculate the energy dissipated in the resistor 
after the switch is opened. Do both methods 
give the same result? Should 
they give the same result? 
~f so, why? ~f not, why not? 
Comment: This problem calls for two quantitative 
analyses of the same situation. If the student is able to 
think of two methods of solution and obtain the same 
answer using both methods no disequilibration will 
result. However, if two different answers are obtained 
the student should check his own work. The discrepancy 
could be resolved quickly if the source of the difference 
was an error in calculation. If, however, the difference 
was due to difficulty in conceptualization, then the 
check will promote self-regulation. 
Fig. 2. Circuit diagram showing 
the capacitor, resistor, switch, 
and battery. 
-- 
Problem 3 The gas temperature at  one level of the upper Comment: This problem presents a paradox because 
atmosphere is about 1 0 0 0 ~ ~ .  The temperature 1 0 0 0 ~ ~  is a very high temperature and yet it is "cold up 
at the surface of a burning match is about the there." Resolution through self-regulation leads to a 
same. Yet a person would be very cold in the more scientific and less everyday notion of the relation 
upper atmosphere. How can that be? between temperature and "cold" or "hot." 
-- 
Problem 4 A glass is exactly full of water at OOC and has a Comment: This problem originally appeared in an article 
cube of ice floating in it. When the ice melts by Richard ~ r a n e . ~  It,as well as other problems in that 
(still at OOC) the water will not overflow, article (for example, problems 8, 17, 18, 26-29), are 
because the ice displaced a volume of water excellent examples of problems which will promote 
equal to the volume of the water into which self-regulation. Problems 34, 41, 42, and 48  which 
the ice melted. OK. Let us look at some fine appeared in a second article by cranes also are thought 
points. In what direction (slight overflow or provoking and should encourage self-regulation. 
the opposite) would each of the following 
affect the result? Give only the direction. 
(a) The ice cube contained some grains of sand. 
(b) The ice cube contained some air bubbles. 
(c) The water (and the glass) were not at  o0 to 
start with, but were at  room temperature. 
(d) The "water" is not water at all, but is a 
Martini which is close to 0' but, due to its 
alcoholic content, has density less than that of 
water. 
Problem 5 If internal energy is partly molecular motion, Comment: Of course, the molecular motion part of 
what is the difference between a hot, internal energy refers to random motion. Thus, 
stationary golf ball sitting on a tee and a cold self-regulation refines or sharpens a global or relatively 
golf ball rapidly moving off the tee. diffuse concept. I t  is typical of students that they only 
assimilate parts of a concept at  first. By provoking them 
to discover or recover all the parts, the concept becomes 
more sharply defined. 
Problem 6 When a cylinder, open at one end, is placed 
over a burning candle which is sitting in a 
container of water the candle flame goes out 
and water rises into the cylinder. Why does the 
flame go out and why does the water rise? 
Note: Not all observations are mentioned in 
the description. What other observations do 
you think you would make if the phenomenon 
was observed? Obtain the necessary materials 
and try the experiment yourself. Try the 
experiment varying the number of candles 
used, the amount of water in the container, the 
size and shape of the cylinder, the speed with 
which you place the cylinder over the candle, 
and anything else you can think of. 
Comment: This problem is one which often yields a 
quick but erroneous solution. Most students will 
hypothesize that the candle goes out because it burned 
up all the oxygen in the cylinder and the water then 
came in to replace the oxygen. Selected items of 
information or questions could be supplied at this point 
t o  provoke students to abandon this idea and continue 
their search. For example: What is produced when a 
flame consumes oxygen? Two burning candles make 
more water rise than one. Small bubbles were observed 
escaping from the bottom of the cylinder. Why might 
this have occurred? These observations contradict the 
initial explanation and should provoke disequilibrium. 
Once other explanations are offered they can be 
analyzed to determine their suitability. They may lead 
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some students to try the experiment to collect further 
data. Explanations can then be evaluated in terms of 
their compatibility with the data and their compatibility 
with physical conceptions. 
Problem 7 Everyone "knows" that to win a tug of war, a 
team has to pull harder than the other team. 
What everyone doesn't know is that, in fact, 
each team always pulls equally hard, even the 
winning team. Under these circumstances, how 
can one team ever win (short of the other team 
just letting go)? 
- 
Comment: Obviously one normally thinks that good 
teams pull harder than poor teams and this is why they 
win. This problem makes one apply the free-body 
diagram method and the action-reaction idea to resolve a 
problem already believed solved by common sense but 
now made to appear strange. This nonroutine use of 
physics concepts makes it more likely they will not  be 
overlooked in the future. 
Problem 8 Polishing surfaces reduces friction between 
them unless you polish them extremely well, 
then friction will increase. How can that be 
true? 
Problem 9 (a) See Fig. 3a. The focal lengths of two 
identical, thin, convex lenses are the same and 
measured to be 20 cm each (F1 = 20 cm, 
Fz = 20 cm). The two lenses are placed next t o  
each other as shown in Fig. 3b and taped 
together at their edges only. The focal length 
of this combination, F,, is 10  cm. Write an 
equation that gives the focal length of a lens 
combination that consists of two lenses having 
identical focal lengths, 
(b) One of the 20 cm focal length lenses is 
replaced by one having a focal length (F3) of 
5 cm. The focal length of the resulting 
combination is measured to  be 4 cm. Write an 
equation that can be used to calculate the focal 
length of a lens combination that consists of 
two lenses of unequal focal lengths. 
(c) Now check your two equations. Are they 
the same? Do you think they should be the 
same. If so,  why? If not, why not? If you 
believe they should be the same but you have 
two different equations rethink the problem 
and try to reduce the two situations to one 
equation. 
Comment: One never expects polishing to increase 
friction. Resolution of this paradox leads to better 
understanding of the relation of macroscopic effects to 
microscopic phenomena, e.g., friction, to microscopic 
and molecular interaction. 
Comment: Students will generally solve parts (a) and (b) 
with little difficulty. However, they will seldom write an 
equation general enough to account for both situations. 
The suggestion in part (c) that the equations should be 
the same and the student's intuitive feeling that a general 
equation could be found, coupled with the original 
incompatible equations should produce disequilibrium 
and provoke the student to rethink the problem. 
- 
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Fig. 3a. Convex lens diagram 
showing the focal point and 
\focal length. 
Fig. 3b. Two convex lenses 
fastened together. 
Problem 10  A student measures his weight by climbing Comment: "Weight is weight is weight," a famous poet 
onto the large platform of a big spring scale. He might have said. So how can a scale read less than one's 
takes a step to one side and notices that just as weight? Worse, how can it also read more? Still worse, if 
he started to do this, the scale registered less it isn't the scale that must be fixed, then how am I, the 
than his weight. Before he could puzzle this student, to fix my ideas? 
through, he noticed that just as he completed 
the step, the scale now registered more than his 
weight. If there is nothing wrong with the 
scale, then what was going on? 
Problem 11 A brick is supported by a string A from the Comment: To be most effective this problem should be 
ceiling, and another string B is attached to the demonstrated. Anything actually seen makes a much 
bottom of the brick. If you give a sudden jerk greater and longer lasting impression than anything 
to B it will break, but if you pull on B steadily, simply heard or read about. This comment of course 
A will break. Since the force is the same both applies to other problems as well. Since the student is 
ways how could this occur? used to thinking in a-temporal terms, he will think that 
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force is force and so equal forces have equal effects. So 
how can the string break in one instance and not in the 
other? Again, common sense is in conflict with 
observation and this use of physics to set the world 
straight is likely to be retained. 
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The Oersted effect on the overhead 
I t  is well known that the effect on a magnetic compass 
needle of being deflected when placed near a 
current-carrying wire was discovered by Hans Oersted in 
1820. An elementary demonstration of this effect is usually 
presented in any course dealing with electricity and 
magnetism, and it is a very convincing proof that moving 
electric charges produce magnetic fields. Several apparatus 
manufacturers* sell a simple device to demonstrate the 
Oersted effect t o  small classes. The apparatus consists of a 
metallic bar bent into a rectangular loop and mounted on 
an insulated base with a compass needle suspended at the 
middle of the loop. When a large current is sent through the 
loop the compass needle will deflect and line up 
perpendicular to the loop; i.e., tangent to the magnetic field 
line at  that position. Reversing the current direction results 
in the needle reversing its direction, showing how the 
magnetic field direction is related to the current direction 
(right-hand rule). 
In a large or auditorium-size lecture class it is difficult 
for all the students to  see the effect demonstrated by this 
small apparatus. Since the overhead projector is used 
extensively in such situations it is natural t o  try to adapt 
this demonstration to the overhead. This is simply 
accomplished by replacing the opaque base with one made 
of Lucite and securing to it an inverted-U-shaped metal bar 
with screw terminals at  each end for connection to a 
current source. The same compass needle that is used in the 
commercial apparatus is suspended under the bar by a 
needle point in the same manner as is found in the 
commercial device (see Fig. 1). When the apparatus is 
operated on the overhead the compass needle deflection is 
*For instance, Oersted's Law Apparatus, manufactured by 
the Sargent-Welch Company, Skokie, Illinois. 
Fig. 1. The Oersted effect demonstrated in place on the 
overhead. 
easily viewed by all. A small piece of paper can be taped to 
one end of the compass needle as a visible reference. A 
further modification (not shown in the figure) uses a 
smaller raised Lucite platform to place the compass needle 
above the metal bar for demonstrating the circular 
symmetry of the magnetic field. 
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